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Prologue 
 My first memorable exposure to Chinese culture came when I was seven years old and 
visiting an elementary school which I would be transferring to the following year. My visit 
coincided with Chinese New Year, and one of the students and her mother had volunteered to 
speak to the class about the holiday. While her mother distributed oranges and hongbao (red 
envelopes) filled with chocolate coins, her daughter explained the traditions of the holiday and 
proudly displayed her beautiful red and golden colored qipao. As a visiting student, the 
experience was quite poignant, as I was simultaneously allowed a window into a tightknit class, 
and learned of new foreign ideas and traditions. In my life I had yet to witness such a willingness 
to share culture with others and the joy and pride in which it was both conducted and received. 
The experience sparked my initial interest in the world beyond my limited American vantage 
point, and especially that of China. 
 I met this girl again when we both shared the same fifth grade class from 2007-2008, and 
I learned that her name was Hannah: we quickly became friends. My worldview had since 
expanded, but my interest in China lingered, and was further fueled by the then upcoming 2008 
Beijing Summer Olympics. Upon noticing my curiosity, she began teaching me simple Mandarin 
phrases during recess. Armed with a few basic expressions and a new friend, we both entered the 
same middle and high school and I began formally studying Mandarin there. During 2013, I was 
able to attend a three week study abroad program in China, which reinforced my desire to 
continue studying the culture, history, and language at a higher level, with the goal of hopefully 
returning to study again in China. My path diverged from my childhood friend, as we both ended 
up attending different universities; nevertheless, I continued to study the language and culture 
which she first introduced to me, and I soon found myself back in China.    
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 As soon as I had left China in 2013, I began planning on how I would return in the future, 
and that opportunity arrived in the form of studying abroad in Harbin, China during the summer 
of 2017. Through the CET Harbin Summer Intensive Language Program at the Harbin Institute 
of Technology, I spent my summer studying Mandarin, modern Chinese history, and 
international business. My objective in studying post-Xinhai Revolution China was to obtain a 
better understanding of the historical context of how the memory of the “Century of 
Humiliation” had shaped modern China. 1 However, I found that my most useful window into 
understanding the lingering effects of the “Century of Humiliation” on the ideology of mainland 
Chinese people (especially youths) came from my discussions with my local Chinese roommates 
and during our shared adventures in Harbin.  
 My Chinese roommates were always curious of my studies and would often peer over my 
shoulder at the Chinese history texts I was studying and translating. They would comment on the 
topics and/or voice their concerns about their political implications, especially regarding Sino-
Japanese relations. We spent many late nights chatting to distract ourselves from the record 
breaking summer heat in our un-air-conditioned rooms. Our conversations varied from cultural 
differences between the United States and China, to our hobbies, to politics, to current events, 
and so on. When I told them that I was considering writing my senior honors thesis on the 
Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, they were both intrigued and we spent several nights 
conversing on the positives and draw backs of the BRI.2 Through our discussions we gradually 
learned about each other’s political views and perspectives on nationalism and imperialism, 
which differed from my original assumptions. Although the BRI is not the chosen focus of my 
                                                          
1 Refers to the period of intervention and imperialism by Western nations and Japan in China between 1839-1949 
2 Belt and Road Initiative, also known as, the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road 
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thesis, our discussions about it allowed me to stumble upon my actual thesis topic: “The Chinese 
Dream.” 
 Two of my most memorable weekend outings in Harbin were a trip to the movies and 
visiting the Unit 731 Museum. Retrospectively, both revolve around different expressions of 
Chinese nationalism. During the semester before leaving for Harbin, I had taken a history class 
on the Pacific War, and learned about Sino-Japanese relations and the roots of the painful history 
between these two nations. In addition to studying the Imperial Japanese Kwantung Army’s 
involvement in northeastern China before and after 1931, Imperial Japan’s invasion of 
Manchuria and the later 1937 invasion of China, we also studied Japanese war crimes. One such 
example was Unit 731, which was a Japanese run, covert biological and chemical warfare 
research and development unit of the Imperial Japanese army, based in Harbin, China. Unit 731 
undertook human experimentation on many Chinese civilians during the course of the Second 
World War. Upon learning that I would be visiting Harbin, my professor encouraged me to visit 
the museum, and so I did. My readings, while graphic and visceral, did not adequately prepare 
me for what I saw. The Unit 731 Museum, was a dark maze of chronological horrors, with 
exhibit explanations inscribed in both Chinese and English. Its horrific narrative culminates with 
a wall of faces and images of injuries sustained by Chinese civilians as a result of the Imperial 
Japanese Army’s successful use of biological warfare bombs against Chinese civilians, and the 
knowledge that the United States aided several of the Japanese experimenters in avoiding justice 
in exchange for the results of their human experimentations. Leaving the observer haunted and 
seeking a sense of closure which history never granted as they exit and return to greet the 
sunlight.  
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On a lighter note, my second memory was when my roommates and I went to go see a 
movie, and while viewing the commercials, I witnessed an event which ultimately caused me to 
amend my desired thesis topic. In American movie theaters, the previews are usually trailers for 
other future movies, but this is slightly different in China. I recall watching several 
advertisements, one being for a children’s hospital, as well as other types of advertisements 
which I would expect to appear during a commercial break while watching television. However, 
the one which struck me most was a propaganda video called “我们的中国梦” (“Our Chinese 
Dream”). It featured several Chinese celebrities talking about and promoting the “Chinese 
Dream.” As this is a phrase which not only is closely associated with Xi Jinping, but also exudes 
nationalistic undertones, I was intrigued. A vital aspect of Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream” is to 
encourage young people to diligently work and “contribute to the revitalization of the nation,” 
which in turn, Xi hopes will bolstered China’s future. 3 Seeing this political ad was initially 
somewhat surprising, but I definitely did not anticipate the response from the Chinese audience, 
which was one of cheering and excitement. Originally, I had thought that this response was 
elicited due to seeing the celebrities, but on a deeper level, it related to their message.  
An ever-growing sense of national pride rooted in historical commemoration of imperial 
times and emphasizing the suffering of the Chinese people during the “Century of Humiliation” 
has caused an outward shift in the projection of Chinese nationalism. Xi’s plan to rejuvenate the 
nation is gradually becoming synonymous with the Belt and Road Initiative and the Nine-Dash 
Line, and contains undertones and overtones of Chinese territorial expansion to reacquire areas 
formally under imperial control centuries ago. 4 Instilling the younger generation with 
                                                          
3 Xinhua. (2013, May 4). Xi urges youths to contribute to 'Chinese dream'. China Daily. 
4 Nine-Dash Line refers to a demarcation line used by the PRC, for their claims over a majority of the South China 
Sea, rejected under UNCLOS in 2016 
Lydia Field 8 
 
nationalism, will serve as a foundational base and pressure for executing Xi’s plans. As evidence 
begins to arise of an internal changes in China fueled by nationalism, external changes and 
mounting international tensions can be seen as well, such as the ongoing conflict over control of 
the South China Sea. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The Chinese Dream 
 The phrase the “Chinese Dream” is closely associated with Xi Jinping, as he first 
promoted the phrase while on a high-profile visit to the National Museum of China on November 
29, 2012. Xi led the other six members of the newly formed CCP Politburo Standing Committee 
in visiting the National Museum of China’s “The Road to Rejuvenation” exhibition. The 
exhibition focused on China’s national experiences from the First Opium War to the present, 
with a particular emphasis on the history of the “Century of Humiliation,” in which China was 
attacked and bullied by foreign imperialists.5 After physically tracing modern Chinese history 
extending from China’s humiliating defeat dealt by Great Britain in the First Opium War to the 
contemporary, Xi announced the “Chinese Dream” as a unifying theme for the Chinese people to 
achieve a great national revival. The specific language used in Xi’s speech refers to a “national 
rejuvenation” and the word “rejuvenation” (复兴 fù xīng) is a historic mobilization tool. 复兴 fù 
xīng has been utilized by almost every generation of modern Chinese leaders, including Sun Yet-
sen, Chiang Kai-shek, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao.6 CCP leaders have “used the national 
humiliation discourse with the goal of rejuvenation to mobilize the Chinese populace to support 
their revolution or reform,” and now it appears to be Xi Jinping’s turn. 7 
 Depending on whom and when you ask, the “Chinese/China Dream” represents different 
ideals. The “Chinese Dream” can embody the aspirations of the world’s largest middle class, and 
                                                          
5 Sørensen, C. T. (2015). The Significance of Xi Jinping's" Chinese Dream" for Chinese Foreign Policy: From" Tao 
Guang Yang Hui" to" Fen Fa You Wei". Journal of China and International Relations, 3(1). Page 55. 
6 Wang, Z. (2014). Never forget national humiliation: Historical memory in Chinese politics and foreign relations. 
Columbia University Press. Page 2. 
7 Ibid. 
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their hopes for a better and more prosperous future.89 The “China Dream” as articulated by 
retired People’s Liberation Army colonel, Liu Mingfu, conveys a desire to reestablish China’s 
historical prestige. He emphasized that through the cultivation of “martial spirit” and military 
power, in addition to the accumulation of wealth, China can successfully reemerge as the most 
powerful nation in the world.10 Furthermore, he stated that China will represent the rise of a non-
hegemonic and benevolent global power.11 It is important to note that before 2012, these 
different views and ambitions were largely divided along Chinese civilian and Chinese military 
and government elite lines respectively. However, Liu Mingfu’s hawkish position tends to align 
largely with that of President Xi Jinping, and was echoed in Xi’s speech detailing the military 
aspects of his vision for the Chinese Dream. 12 President Xi Jinping emphasized that the Chinese 
Dream is “‘the dream of a strong military’” and that to “‘achieve the great revival of the Chinese 
nation…we must ensure there is unison between a prosperous country and a strong military,’” 
seemingly echoing Liu Mingfu’s worldview. 13 It is uncertain whether or not Xi Jinping read Liu 
Mingfu’s book, regardless, the “Chinese Dream” under the care of Xi Jinping has become a 
hybrid ideal of economic prosperity and military might.  
 As previously mentioned, former Chinese leaders instituted reforms by framing their 
chosen issue as necessary for “rejuvenation” (复兴 fù xīng), and Jiang Zemin used this language 
to reform modern Chinese nationalism. In the wake of China’s “reform and opening up” (改革开
                                                          
8 Wang, H. H. (2010). The Chinese dream: The rise of the world's largest middle class and what it means to you. 
Bestseller Press. 
9 McMahon, D. (2018). China's Great Wall of Debt: Shadow Banks, Ghost Cities, Massive Loans, and the End of 
the Chinese Miracle. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 
10 Mingfu, L. (2015). The China dream: Great power thinking and strategic posture in the post-American era. New 
York, NY: CN Times Books. (The Chinese version was originally published in 2010.) 
11 Ibid. 
12 Hawkish: advocating for an aggressive or warlike policy, especially in terms of foreign affairs 
13 Wong, E. (2012, December 14). China’s Communist Party Chief Acts to Bolster Military. The  
New York Times.  
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放 Gǎi gé kāi fàng) and the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, the CCP’s legitimacy needed to be 
reaffirmed since the Party’s “official Communist ideology [had] lost credibility.”14 After the 
collapse of Communism as a unifying ideology, patriotism and nationalism became the most 
important tool for garnering support of the Party’s rule, and the CCP instituted a “patriotic 
education campaign” to promote these feelings. The patriotic education campaign was designed 
to present Chinese youths with detailed information about China’s traumatic and humiliating 
experience in the face of Western and Japanese imperialism, and that the CCP-led revolution 
won national independence and ultimately ended national humiliation.15 Additionally, the CCP 
began marketing its new mission as facilitating “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” 
and by using the word “rejuvenation,” it framed that the Party’s work as a collective effort to 
restore China to its former position and glory.16  
 Under the patriotic education campaign, the new curriculum redirected protest towards 
foreign enemies, and the previous narrative of ‘‘China as a victor’’ was replaced by ‘‘China as a 
victim’’ in nationalist discourse.17 Another goal of the patriotic education campaign was to 
reinforce the notion that “only the Party [could] develop and rejuvenate China,” to further 
strengthen CCP legitimacy. 18 Nevertheless, this legitimacy is founded on distortions of Chinese 
history, especially regarding the Party’s role in ending China’s “Century of Humiliation,” which 
requires the CCP to continuously maintain and protect this narrative. Consequently, Jiang 
                                                          
14 Wang, Z. (2008). National humiliation, history education, and the politics of historical memory: Patriotic 
education campaign in China. International Studies Quarterly, 52(4), 783-806. Page 788. 
15 Ibid. Page 791. 
16 Wang, Z. (2014). The Chinese dream: Concept and context. Journal of Chinese Political Science, 19(1), 1-13. 
Page 6. 
17 Wang, Z. (2008). National humiliation, history education, and the politics of historical memory: Patriotic 
education campaign in China. International Studies Quarterly, 52(4), 783-806. Page 792. 
18 Ibid. Page 794.  
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Zemin’s sponsored patriotic education campaign was largely responsible for the rapid shift of 
Chinese social movements from internal-orientated, anti-corruption, and anti-dictatorship 
democratic movements in the 1980s, to the external-oriented, anti-Western nationalism seen 
since the 1990s.19 Due to the “rejuvenation” work of his predecessors, especially that of Jiang 
Zemin, this allowed for Xi Jinping’s administration to have access to a preexisting foundation of 
Chinese nationalism and anti-foreign sentiments. Xi has begun to shift this modern Chinese 
nationalism, and it’s attached anti-Japanese, anti-Western, and anti-imperialist sentiments, into 
its current expansionist form, in the name of “national rejuvenation” which the “Chinese Dream” 
encompasses. 
 
China’s Complicated History 
To provide context and understanding of the CCP’s cultivation of modern Chinese 
nationalism through the use of historical distortions of critical events, the chronicle of Chinese 
history must be examined to clarify the motives of the Party. The fundamental governing system 
of the modern nation-state of the People’s Republic of China is quite different from that of the 
divine right dynastic rule of its past; nevertheless, China still views itself as the historical 
hegemon of the Asia-Pacific region. During Imperial times, China was believed to be the center 
of the universe and the Emperor of China was considered to be the Son of Heaven. The Emperor, 
and his dynasty, maintained legitimacy by receiving the Mandate of Heaven (天命 tiān mìng). 
For a dynasty which had received the Mandate of Heaven, crops were plentiful, there was peace 
and prosperity among the people, the kingdom lacked many natural disasters and possessed a 
well-functioning government. It was said that all lands below heaven (天下 tiān xià) belonged to 
                                                          
19 Ibid. Page 794. 
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the Emperor, and as China saw itself as the center of world, the Emperor’s domain also applied 
to the kingdoms and people’s beyond China’s borders. When formal foreign relations were 
established, it was politically beneficial for Chinese Emperors to make nations beyond the 
Middle Kingdom into tributary states. By prostrating themselves before the Emperor and 
proclaiming Chinese cultural superiority, foreign dignitaries secured tributary state status for 
their nation and a beneficial economic relationship with China. In turn, the Middle Kingdom 
maintained that China was the center of the world and that the Emperor had the Mandate of 
Heaven, because it appeared as though the Emperor controlled all of the known world.  
 As the aforementioned tributary state system of Imperial China has been used by the 
Chinese Communist Party as evidence of China’s past of peaceful and non-imperialistic 
management of its neighboring nations in the Asia-Pacific, the voyages of Zheng He are also 
often used in tandem with this argument. The Chinese seafaring exploration under Zheng He 
during the early 15th century have been subjected to distortions, and it is claimed that Zheng He 
established diplomatic relations for China through aweing foreign populations with the massive 
size of his ships. Consequently, Zheng He has become a symbol of Chinese benevolence, 
exploration, and naval excellence. Nevertheless, Zheng He’s armada were actually colossal troop 
carriers.20 The “awe” that foreign countries felt upon Zheng He’s arrival was the result of 
intimidation, causing them to ultimately provided tribute for the Emperor. Zheng He wielded the 
power of his fleet against those who disrupted and/or disrespected the Emperor’s tributary state 
system, taking on pirates,21 and even launching a land war against the Kingdom of Kotte in 
                                                          
20 French, H. W. (2017). Everything Under the Heavens: How the Past Helps Shape China's Push for Global Power. 
Vintage. 
21 China Heritage Project. (2005, June). Shipping News: Zheng He's Sexcentenary. Retrieved February 10, 2018. 
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present day Sri Lanka.22 However, this aggressive narrative is not the one favored by the Chinese 
Communist Party in their attempt to propagate China’s historical peaceful rise and reign. This is 
one of many examples of distorted memories of history that the CCP has used to justify its 
expansion. 
 Due to the uneasy rule of the Chinese Communist Party, the Party is continuously 
searching for ways to further its legitimacy. To prevent regime change, the CCP has also adhered 
to the principle of 内乱外患 (nèi luàn wài huàn), “preventing civil strife and deterring foreign 
aggression,” just as their imperial forefathers had. This was particularly evident through the 
Party’s implementation of an education shift in 1991, after the Tiananmen Square Massacre. The 
new school curriculum was designed to highlight Chinese suffering at the hands of outsiders, 
with a particular emphasis on China’s百年国耻 (bǎi nián guó chǐ) “Century of Humiliation” due 
to imperialism and the demonization of Japan, as a result of the crimes it had committed against 
China before and during World War II.23 This national education underscored that China needed 
to regain its prestige, which could be actualized through regaining territories lost during “the 
Century of Humiliation.” The CCP was successful in its desire to misdirect feelings of 
malcontent away from the Party, and the Chinese people have largely unified around anti-
Japanese, anti-Imperialist, and anti-Western sentiments. Consequently, nationalism has surged 
within China. However, the Chinese Communist Party may have been too successful in its 
efforts to shape national identity.  
                                                          
22 Sien, L. C., & Church, S. K. (2012). Zheng He and the Afro-Asian World. Melaka, Malaysia: Melaka Museums 
Corporation (PERZIM) and International Zheng He Society. p. 265. 
23 French, H. W. (2017). Everything Under the Heavens: How the Past Helps Shape China's Push for Global Power. 
Vintage. 
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 The Chinese Communist Party is weary of the population it rules over, as the Chinese 
people vastly outnumber the ruling elite. Therefore, the CCP cannot risk losing the support of 
Chinese public opinion. Over the past decade, as China has fully emerged onto the global stage, 
public pressure has begun to mount for China to use its growing military power to reassert itself 
and remove the United States from the Asia-Pacific. Nevertheless, by centering modern Chinese 
history on the demoralizations of “the Century of Humiliation,” the Chinese government must 
not bring any further “humiliations” to China. Consequently, the Chinese Communist Party has 
become a prisoner of the nationalism it created, because it is expected to wield China’s power to 
its fullest to regain its hegemony, and it cannot fail. Thus, China and President Xi Jinping have 
embarked on a dangerous geopolitical and military expansionist gambit in the South China Sea. 
 
The South China Sea Disputes 
 The South China Sea is one of the biggest geopolitical flashpoints in Asia. The disputes 
involve China, many of its neighbors, such as Vietnam, Taiwan, The Philippines, Malaysia, 
Brunei, and also the United States, which functions as a security guarantee in the region. The 
South China Sea encompasses an area of 1,400,000 square miles, in which one-third of the 
world’s shipping passes through, carrying $5 trillion worth of trade a year.24 The South China 
Sea contains lucrative fisheries that produce 12 percent of the global catch, and provides food 
security for millions of people in Southeast Asia and beyond.25 Furthermore, the South China 
Sea is estimated to hold 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 11 billion barrels of oil, with 
much more potentially still undiscovered.26 Whoever controls these resources can influence 
                                                          
24 Page 28. 
25 Ibid.  
26 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Independent Statistics & Analysis. (2013, 
February 7). South China Sea.  
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energy, food, and economic security in the broader Asia-Pacific, which increases the geopolitical 
implications of their distribution. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), these resources should be divided based on set geographical distances from nations’ 
coastlines. However, China claims a majority of the South China Sea based on the nation’s 
“historical rights” over the region, rather than adhering to the geography based method outlined 
by UNCLOS for maritime entitlements.  
 UNCLOS prescribed zones to determine which state has special rights and sovereignty 
regarding exploration and use of marine resources. A nation’s territorial waters extend out to 12 
nautical miles, and the state can set laws, regulate the use of these waters, and use any resources 
found there. Vessels were also given the right of innocent passage through any territorial waters. 
“Innocent passage” is defined by the convention as passing through waters in a continuous and 
expeditious manner, and is not "prejudicial to the peace, good order or the security" of the 
coastal state.27 However, UNCLOS allows for innocent passage of foreign ships to be 
temporarily suspended in specified areas of a nation’s territorial sea if the suspension is essential 
for the protection of its security.28 Beyond these initial 12 nautical miles of sovereign territorial 
sea, UNCLOS also provides further provisions for detailing “sovereign rights” for maritime 
entitlements falling under a country’s exclusive economic zone and/or continental shelf.  
 A state's exclusive economic zone starts at the edge of its territorial sea and extends 
outward to a distance of 200 nautical miles. Within this area, the nation has sole exploration 
rights over all natural resources, whether living or non-living, and also has the exclusive right to 
construct artificial islands, installations, and structures.29 However, these artificial islands, 
                                                          
27 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, Articles 17-19. 
28 Ibid. Article 25 
29 Ibid. Article 56. 
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installations, and structures do not possess the status of islands and have no territorial sea of their 
own.30 States also have rights to the seabed and subsoil of its continental shelf, which can extend 
up to 350 nautical miles beyond the nation’s territorial sea, but the column of water extending 
from the seabed to the surface is not part of their exclusive economic zone.31 Due to the 
geographical closeness of modern nation-states, especially within smaller swaths of sea, EEZs 
can overlap and countries can 
have legitimate competing 
claims to territory within these 
zones. However, a majority of 
the Chinese territorial claims 
over the South China Sea, as 
seen within their Nine-Dash 
Line in Figure 1, push well 
beyond this legal limit. 
 Since 2012, China has 
engaged in a series of large-
scale land reclamation projects 
in the South China Sea and has 
created over 3,200 acres of 
artificial islands.32 The 
artificial islands were created 
                                                          
30 Ibid. Article 60. 
31 Ibid. Article 76 
32 Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. (2016). Island tracker. 
Figure 1: China's 2009 Nine-Dash Line map submission to the UN  
(Courtesy of the United Nations) 
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by dredging sand onto coral reefs, shoals, and banks, and were then covered with concrete to 
make into permanent structures, which could be built upon. Many of the reefs and structures that 
have been part of China’s land reclamation program are also contested between Vietnam, the 
Philippines, and Malaysia. In 2013, the Philippines brought a case against Chinese “historical 
claims” over the South China Sea before the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, and 
on July 12, 2016 the arbitral tribunal issued its ruling largely in favor of the Philippines. The 
tribunal ruled that any Chinese historic rights to the resources of the South China Sea were 
“extinguished [when China became a Party to UNCLOS]” and that it found “no evidence that 
China had historically 
exercised exclusive 
control over the waters 
or their resources.”33 
This ruling clarified 
that China had no legal 
basis for its usage of 
the Nine-Dash Line. 
 The tribunal 
found that none of the 
Spratly Islands could 
be classified as legal 
islands because they 
cannot sustain a stable 
                                                          
33 Permanent Court of Arbitration. (2016, July 12). The South China Sea Arbitration [Press release]. Pages 1-2. 
Figure 2: Map of Territorial claims in the South China Sea (Courtesy of Voice of America) 
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human community or independent economic activities, and therefore only are entitled to 
territorial seas and not EEZs.34 The tribunal found that Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery 
Cross Reef, Gaven Reef (all a part of the Spratly Islands) and Scarborough Shoal, were rocks and 
entitled to a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea. However, it found that Hughes Reef and Mischief 
Reef were below water at high-tide and therefore generated no maritime entitlements of their 
own.35 It also ruled that Kennan Reef is a low-tide elevation, while Second Thomas Shoal and 
Reed Bank are submerged and belong to the Philippine continental shelf.36 These ruling 
effectively invalidated any Chinese territorial claims within the Nine-Dash Line, but China 
rejected the ruling, continued with land-reclamation, and militarized many of the islands 
anyways. As many of these islands are not considered “islands” under UNCLOS for the purpose 
of deciding maritime jurisdiction, the United States has been conducting freedom of navigation 
operations near these maritime features, to accentuate the view of the international community 
and UNCLOS (which the United States is not a party to) that China is attempting to enforce 
illegal Chinese territorial seas and sovereignty. 
 With each passing year, the PLAN has become more aggressive and antagonist in 
response to US freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. On September 30, 
2018 the USS Decatur was conducting FON operations in the South China Sea, and traveled 
within 12 nautical miles of Gaven and Johnson Reefs in the Spratly Islands.37 The USS Decatur 
was then approached by the Chinese destroyer Lanzhou, after aggressive maneuvering, the two 
vessels had a near collision and came within 45 yards of each other.38 In response to the incident, 
                                                          
34 Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. (2016). Philippines v. China: Arbitration Outcomes. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Reuters with the Associated Press. (2018, October 02). US says Chinese destroyer was 'aggressive' and 
'unsafe,' coming dangerously close to American ship. CNBC. 
38 Ibid. 
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China’s Ministry of National Defense spokesperson condemned the American “illegal 
provocation in the name of ‘freedom of navigation’” and emphasized that the actions “posed a 
grave threat to China’s sovereignty and security.”39 Furthermore, the Ministry of National 
Defense asserted that “China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China 
Sea and their adjacent waters” and that the military will “take all necessary measures to firmly 
safeguard sovereignty and security.”40 Within a framework of international law, this claim of 
indisputable sovereignty does not hold true, but within the context of Chinese nationalism and 
patriotic education, it has merit. Since the 1940s, generations of Chinese students have learned 
from their geography textbooks that James Shoal (Zengmu Ansha), a mere 52 miles from the 
Malaysian coast, is the southernmost point of China’s territory.41 Textbooks in most societies 
present an “official” version of events and highlight narratives that shape contemporary 
patriotism, the Nine-Dash Line now appears on official Chinese maps and passports, which has 
both verbally and visually normalized the teaching of the Nine-Dash Line. 42 Additionally, after 
the South China Sea ruling was issued, official censors moved quickly to curtail online 
discussion that seemed to overstep the bounds of acceptable nationalist discourse and censors 
removed Weibo posts that contradicted the party line.43 From a Chinese perspective, the South 
China Sea is Chinese sovereign territory, because a majority of the population have never been 
taught otherwise.  
 
 
                                                          
39 Xinhua. (2018, October 2). Chinese military opposes US provocation in South China Sea. Xinhua Net. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Wang, Z. (2014, August 26). The Nine-Dashed Line: 'Engraved in Our Hearts'. The Diplomat. 
42 Wang, Z. (2008). National humiliation, history education, and the politics of historical memory: Patriotic 
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43 Allen-Ebrahimian, B. (2016, July 12). After South China Sea Ruling, China Censors Online Calls for War. 
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Conclusion 
 China’s economic growth is plateauing and the nation is facing mounting social issues, 
such as its aging population, environmental degradation, and corruption, among other things. 
Moreover, Xi Jinping has yet to accomplish all the goals and aspirations of his administration 
regarding the transition of China into a fully-fledged economic and military hegemon. As Xi’s 
administration has faced criticism and challenges from Chinese elites, it has implemented 
measures to control these dissenting voices, ranging from anti-corruption campaigns to 
censorship and regulations to fear. The CCP has been biding its time since 1979 and is now 
implementing its broader strategy for dethroning the United States’ position as the most powerful 
nation in the region and the world.44 China has been subtly testing how far it can push the norms 
of the Asia-Pacific region in a continuous cycle of mounting tensions and then reducing them (放
手 fàng shǒu).45 These cycles are quite easy to distinguish, and some of the most recent 
examples of rising tensions are China’s disputes with the Philippines, Vietnam, and other 
countries over the South China Sea, and clashes with Japan over the Senkaku Islands. 
Additionally, China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are 
both examples of cooling tensions. These cycles used to be distinct from each other, but more 
recently China has been able to simultaneously maintain rising pressures in one area and falling 
pressures in other, a testament to the success of China’s global integration. The next decade is 
likely China’s best opportunity to reaffirm itself as the regional hegemon, which will potentially 
                                                          
44 Refers to Deng Xiaoping’s dictum “hide your capabilities, bide your time” and also the use of “reform and 
opening up” to provide China the economic tools to gain prosperity and power over time 
45 MacFarquhar, R. (Ed.). (1997). The Politics of China: the eras of Mao and Deng. Cambridge University Press. p. 
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make 2020-2030 some of the most dangerous and tension filled years in the region in recent 
memory.46 
Research Questions 
This thesis revolves around the following questions: What developments regarding Chinese 
nationalism have allowed for Chinese expansionism to be a vital part of the “Chinese Dream,” 
especially within the context of the South China Sea? Additionally, how has social media aided 
in disseminating and achieving the goals of the “Chinese Dream”? 
In this thesis, I will argue that through the use of a glorified imperial hegemonic history and 
an education curriculum which emphasizes the victimization of China during the “Century of 
Humiliation,” the Chinese Communist Party has established itself as the instrument through 
which “national rejuvenation” is possible and is essential to the revitalized Chinese national 
identity. Consequently, the Chinese Communist Party has bound itself to an aggressive and 
expansionist form of nationalism which demands that China reassert itself over its former 
domain and that this identity can be seen through social media, especially within the context of 
the South China Sea disputes. 
 
Outline of Thesis 
After this introduction, my thesis will explain my research methodology and contain a 
literature review examining the major publications around the topics of Chinese nationalism, 
Chinese social media and censorship, and the South China Sea and its subsequent conflicts.  
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 Following the literature review, the third chapter seeks to review major events in the 
“Century of Humiliation” which engendered lasting anti-Japanese sentiments. This chapter 
establishes the linkages between mobilizing anti-Japanese sentiment to disputed territory as a 
transferable framework to the South China Sea disputes. 
In the fourth chapter, I trace the historical roots of modern Chinese nationalism and 
review major events in the “Century of Humiliation” which engendered enduring anti-Western 
and anti-Imperialist sentiments, and analyzed their implications for the modern context. 
 In the fifth chapter, I will analyze the role of Chinese social media in fostering and 
shaping Chinese nationalism in accordance with the goals of the “Chinese Dream.” I will 
primarily focus on the micro-blogging platform Weibo and how this has allowed for growing 
support of Chinese expansion in the South China Sea. Additionally, it will use the framework 
provided by the 2012 Chinese anti-Japanese protests to analyze mobilization around territorial 
disputes on Weibo. 
 Lastly, my conclusion will consider the future of the South China Sea region and 
expansionist Chinese nationalism, as seen through social media. Additionally, I will present my 
findings and policy suggestions. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology and Literature Review 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the methods, sources, and framework utilized to answer my 
research questions and discuss the impact these inputs had on my research process and the 
ultimate influence on my findings. First, I will describe the methods and the framework I used to 
answer my research questions and label the specific types of sources I utilized at each stage. I 
will then go into depth about the types of sources I applied, decisions I made in selecting 
sources, and the subsequent tensions and commonalities between and within different literatures. 
In this chapter, I review several foundational and informative works which will support 
the framework of my thesis. There are many different perspectives on what constitutes the 
“Chinese Dream” and how it interacts with Chinese identity, social media platforms, and past, 
current, and future events in the South China Sea. Through my reading, I have discovered several 
aspects of agreement and several of contention among writers who discuss the “Chinese/China 
Dream” and its other overlapping topic areas with my thesis. I have narrowed these points down 
to the following: Chinese Nationalism, Chinese Social Media Communication and Censorship, 
and the South China Sea. I will engage critically with many sources that examine these themes 
and offer explanations for the construction of the Chinese Dream within an expansionist 
framework47 and how it interacts with Chinese nationalism, Chinese Social Media, and Chinese 
actions taken in the South China Sea. 
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Methodology 
 To be able to determine the developments surrounding Chinese nationalism which have 
allowed for Chinese expansionism to be a vital aspect of the “Chinese Dream,” within the 
context of the South China Sea, I first had to understand the environment in which these events 
occurred. The methods used for this portion of thesis research were critical readings and analysis 
of relevant materials. I began by studying elements of the “Chinese Dream” and the links 
between Xi Jinping’s original announcement of the “Chinese Dream,” modern Chinese history, 
and mobilization language. Additionally, after firmly comprehending the background of the 
South China Sea territorial disputes, I revisited modern Chinese history to locate and understand 
the sources of Chinese nationalistic motivations for territorial expansion. I was then able to 
isolate specific events within Chinese history which both cultivated and altered existing Chinese 
nationalism. I started with the “Century of Humiliation” and progressed chronologically through 
history, and eventually arrived in the 1990s and learned of the external re-orientation of Chinese 
nationalism achieved through the CCP’s “patriotic education campaign.” 
  Additionally, to determine how Chinese social media has aided in dissemination and of 
the “Chinese Dream,” I studied censorship, the environment of Weibo, Chinese cyberspace 
policy, and previous examples of Chinese mobilization language and modern Chinese anti-
foreign protest movements. I decided to use the 2012 Chinese anti-Japanese demonstrations and 
the multiple escalatory and de-escalatory roles of Weibo as a framework for understanding 
Chinese cyber nationalism and expansionist nationalism in response to perceived threats to 
Chinese territorial sovereignty. The second portion of my thesis research involved actively 
searching through related Weibo posts and translating them. I used anti-American protest 
language from Chinese student protests of the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, 
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and conducted many Weibo searches through the use of key terms generated from this protest 
language. I also studied the role of state-sponsored media sources on Weibo and the actions they 
took to foster expansionist Chinese nationalism and pro-military feelings in the South China Sea. 
 
Chinese Nationalism 
As my thesis pertains to the construction and expression of contemporary Chinese 
expansionist nationalism, I began with a generalized analysis of Western nationalism and how it 
differs from Chinese nationalism. The Western theoretical foundations and studies of nationalism 
can be traced to philosophers such as Locke, Hobbes, Machiavelli, Rousseau, and others who 
conceptualized the relationship between rulers and individuals, sometimes referred to as a social 
contract. “Nationalism” is a comparatively newer term when likened with the word “patriotism” 
and their cognates. These two terms are often used interchangeably within the English language 
to imply a commitment to one’s country, a desire to ensure its well-being and that of its people, 
and a readiness to defend it, especially in times of crisis. Nevertheless, a distinction has emerged 
in the tone and connotation of these words. In addition, to the definition which is similar to 
“patriotism,” the term “nationalism” has also subsumed and now implies feelings of national 
superiority.  
One of the foundational texts on nationalism which depicts a nation as a socially 
constructed community, is Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities. I have used this text and 
his concept of an imagined community to further my understanding of previous historical 
examples of constructed identity. I will apply this framework to the construction of modern 
Chinese nationalism and also engage critically with it in relation to the “patriotic education 
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campaign” and expansionist Chinese nationalism seen on social media platforms. Benedict 
Anderson emphasizes that “many different cultures have ‘unified’ by political, military, cultural, 
economic and social processes.”48 A vital aspect of constructing a unifying “we” is by setting it 
against another group or groups who do not belong to that collective and could threaten its 
existence. Group identities when tied to expansionist military and economic aims, are 
contextualized through the schema of nation-state politics. Zhao (2004) argues that under state 
nationalism, there is a visible convergence of political mobilization and territorial sovereignty 
issues. Consequently, these identities require constant maintenance and must be continuously 
refined to highlight in-group similarities and out-group differences.  
I have chosen to discuss war time nationalism because several Chinese and Western 
sources have referred to the conflicts in the South China Sea as “warm” war. While different 
from both a “cold”49 and “hot”50 war, “warm”51 war does have similarities with traditional 
wartime mentalities. During times of war, nationality and ethnicity are valued above all else, for 
wars are fought between nations, and nations are held together by the perceived and imagined 
commonalities of its citizens. The most potent military weapons a country can possess are not 
made of steel or explosives but made of ideals and emotions: nationalism. Having thousands of 
soldiers whose hearts overflow with patriotic fervor, are much more effective than the forcibly 
conscripted militiamen of yesteryear. Nationalism is often defined as feelings of pride in one’s 
nation and/or national identity. There are many different “brands” of nationalism, for nationalism 
                                                          
48 Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. Verso Books. 
Pages 111. 
49 Cold war: a period of hostile relations between rivals where direct open warfare is largely avoided  
50 Hot war: a conflict in which actual armed fighting occurs between the belligerent parties  
51 Warm war: a period when parties are engaging in negotiations for peace, but continue to mobilize forces and 
implement war plans in preparation for war 
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has evolved over the centuries and now rarely stands alone. Jingoism, chauvinism,52 and 
xenophobia53 all can be intertwined with nationalism, and are integral to the understanding of 
modern nationalism. Furthermore, within the Chinese context, modern Chinese nationalism also 
has anti-foreign sentiments attached to it. 
Wartime expansionist nationalism, as conceived by Western scholars, needs an ethnic 
identity to attach itself to, for this furthers the idea of unity among a militarized nation’s citizens. 
This ethnic identity unites those with a shared language, a shared faith, and a shared racial 
ancestry under a common banner. Often this ethnic identity is first created by defining what the 
ideal citizen is not. In doing so, a fifth column is created,54 as an in-group cannot exist without 
an out-group. Wang (2014) asserts that Chinese Nationalism is a unique case, especially in 
regard to the identity chosen and utilized to create its modern national self-concept, as the “ideal 
Chinese citizen” has been rebranded to be those who are “patriotic” and loyal to the CCP.55 The 
use of “othering” identities when paired with nationalism provide a foundation for military 
formation and subsequent racism that stem from these “othering” ethnic identities, serve as the 
basis for large-scale, militarized violence. Nationalism, paired with attaching an “othering” 
ethnic identity upon one’s enemies, increases the willingness of such groups to kill and sacrifice, 
as well as commit atrocities against racialized others. Fortunately, China and the United States 
have not yet reached this point, and hopefully never will. Nonetheless, tensions have begun to 
                                                          
52 Chauvinism: exaggerated and/or aggressive patriotism which usually appears as excessive or prejudiced loyalty to 
one’s cause, group, or gender 
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54 Fifth column: a group of people who seemingly undermine a larger group from within 
55 Wang, Z. (2014). Never forget national humiliation: Historical memory in Chinese politics and foreign relations. 
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boil and have manifested in the form of naval brinkmanship in the South China Sea, among other 
things. 
As a modern concept, nationalism was introduced to China by Chinese elites in the late 
19th century in an effort to “rejuvenate” (复兴 fù xīng) China. Chinese nationalism played a vital 
role in Chinese politics of the 20th century, and much of modern Chinese mobilization is still 
initiated by elites in a top-down fashion. Modern Chinese nationalism was cultivated in stages, 
and were largely reactionary to “humiliations” experienced by China. According to Zhao (2004), 
the first stage was from the First Opium War (1839-1842) to the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-
1895), in which the concept of nationalism was introduced and imported to China through elites. 
Since the First Opium War, foreign aggression and incursion became a recurring problem for 
China, and would continue for much of the course of the “Century of Humiliation.” During this 
time, nationalist consciousness had begun to emerge among Chinese elites and intellectuals, and 
was later disseminated throughout urban populations. The second stage occurred from the end of 
the First Sino-Japanese War (1895) to the early years of the Republic of China (1919), and was 
marked by continued foreign aggression and imperialism and Chinese nationalist movements and 
revolutions. The third stage consisted of the founding of the Republic of China (1919) and 
concluded with the founding of the People’s Republic of China (1949), and was marked by 
violence (caused by foreign invasion and Chinese civil strife), diverging nationalist thought, and 
the end of the “Century of Humiliation.” The fourth stage (1949-1990) witnessed evolving and 
different forms of nationalism in the PRC, culminating in the form of the 1989 Tiananmen 
protests. While the fifth and final stage is modern Chinese nationalism (Zhao, 2004; Wang, 
2014). This new nationalism is a continuation of various forms of nationalism observed in the 
previous stages and is manifested by the implementation of “the great rejuvenation of China” and 
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the “patriotic education campaign” in the 1990s. It is important to revisit the history of the 
“Century of Humiliation” as it was responsible for the origin of Chinese nationalism, but also 
conveys how this history is utilized to shape its contemporary form, and I will do so in later 
chapters. 
The discussion and analysis of Chinese foreign policy in the post-1989 era is dynamic 
and Whiting (1995) suggests separating Chinese nationalism into three types: affirmative, 
assertive, and aggressive. Affirmative nationalism focuses “exclusively on ‘us’ as a positive in-
group referent with pride in attributes and achievements.”56 Assertive nationalism adds a “them” 
negative out-group to the previous conversation, which serves to confront the in-group’s interests 
and identity. Lastly, Whiting (1995) states that aggressive nationalism isolates a foreign nation as 
its enemy, which seemingly possess an imminent threat to the in-group nation and necessitates 
action. While different in their ultimate results, each type of nationalism fosters a national self-
construct, targeting attitudes, engendering external-oriented anger, and mobilizing behaviors. 
When domestic politics and external factors challenge the nation’s legitimacy, these types of 
nationalisms can converge to induce a “siege mentality” that fuels state nationalism. 57 However, 
some scholars (Xu, 2007) argue that given China’s ascendance to international power status, the 
“siege mentality” model does not fully depict contemporary Chinese nationalism and must be 
further revised. Xu (2007) further divides Chinese nationalism into official or nonofficial 
nationalism. The CCP’s responses to ensure its legitimacy after the 1989 Tiananmen protests are 
largely indicative of official nationalism. According to Xu (2007), official Chinese nationalism 
includes three themes: sovereignty, territorial reunification, and the continued reform-and-
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opening-up. Additionally, Xu (2007) emphasizes that nonofficial nationalism combines both 
affirmative and assertive postures, and incorporates glorified Chinese history, national pride, and 
perceived Western influence and “insults.”  
 Whiting’s (1995) and Xu’s (2007) broader assessments of Chinese nationalism held true 
until the 2008 global financial crisis where there was a surging increase in popular nationalist 
sentiment. According to Zhao (2013) the 2008 global economic crash caused a “convergence of 
Chinese state nationalism and popular nationalism [that called] for a more muscular Chinese 
foreign policy.”58 In the time since the economic crash, active duty senior military officers were 
allowed to openly pressure the CCP to push back against the US on many sensitive foreign 
policy issues, such as maritime territorial disputes.59 Additionally, since the CCP has gained a 
sense of empowerment through the nation’s new level of wealth and military power, while 
simultaneously fearing the rise of domestic social, economic, and political tensions, “the 
communist state has become more willing to play to the popular nationalist gallery in pursuing 
the so-called core national interests.”60 These popular Chinese nationalist voices share the 
government’s “dream of making China a strong and powerful country that could stand up against 
the bullies of the Western powers, [which causes] popular nationalism [to be] particularly 
suspicious about a Western conspiracy and hidden agenda to slow down or even stop China's rise 
and, therefore, [are] more vocal and emotional than the state in criticism of Western evil 
intentions.”61 Galvanized by public pressure and China’s rising power, the CCP expanded the 
“core interest issues in 2009 to include the maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea… 
                                                          
58 Zhao, S. (2013). Foreign policy implications of Chinese nationalism revisited: The strident turn. Journal of 
Contemporary China, 22(82), 535-553. Page. 535. 
59 Ibid.  
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[whereas] China's official statements on core interest issues involving sovereignty and territorial 
integrity had [previously] referred almost exclusively to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang.”62  
A majority of the “popular nationalists are young… [and are] connected mostly by new 
information technology, particularly the Internet, [and] the youth popular nationalist movement 
gained momentum in the 2000s.”63 These young popular nationalists routinely take to the 
Internet and its social media platforms to claim that “the communist state as neither confident 
enough nor competent enough in safeguarding China's vital national interests and too chummy 
with Japan and soft in dealing with the United States.”64 These voices cause official CCP 
responses to international incidents to concurrently appear “hard” to a foreign observer, while 
“soft” and conciliatory to the domestic citizen. Furthermore, Zhao (2013) states that “the 
commercialization of a large portion of the Chinese media pushed newspapers to make money 
from subscriptions and advertising…and nationalistic expression [became] a powerful approach 
to attract readers' attention.”65 This caused a majority of Chinese news and media commentators 
to criticize “government policy from a hawkish, nationalist direction [rather] than from a 
moderate, internationalist one.”66 Zhao (2013) asserts that this type of nationalism “makes 
compromise extremely difficult if not impossible on issues that China deems as its core interest 
and thereby push China to adopt increasingly bellicose foreign policies.”67 Under the 
administration of Hu Jintao, the CCP emphasized China’s “peaceful rise,” but under the 
leadership of Xi Jinping, this approach has partially been abandoned in favor of the aggressive 
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and expansionist nationalism which the broader Chinese public and online community had been 
clamoring for.  
Since the 1990s, Chinese nationalism was constructed through the patriotic education 
campaign orchestrated by the CCP, which used “patriotism” to bolster nationalism and ensure 
the populous’ loyalty and maintain its legitimacy (Zhao, 2004; Wang, 2014). Wang (2014) 
asserts that the mass media played an important role in the promotion of state-sponsored 
nationalism. By controlling and limiting engagement with international news narratives that were 
unfavorable to the CCP’s agenda, state controlled media reinforced the construction and 
maintenance of anti-foreign sentiments. Chinese foreign policy has assumed a more assertive 
posture towards the United States and Japan but remains relatively conciliatory towards smaller 
countries when conflict arises, as a result of the construction of historical memory (Wang, 2014). 
Wang (2014) shows that when looking to the glories of China’s past, party-approved textbooks 
engage in selective remembering and forgetting. Furthermore, by selecting which aspects of 
Chinese history to remember and which parts to erase, the CCP has used historical memory to 
cultivate a new Chinese national consciousness, which Wang (2014) calls a “Chosen-Myth-
Trauma (CMT) complex.”68 Many of these chosen national myths arise from glorified Chinese 
imperial history, the CCP’s role in ending the “Century of Humiliation” and the rejuvenation of 
China. Conversely, a majority of the chosen traumas arise from the “Century of Humiliation” 
and recent interactions between China, Japan, and the United States where Chinese civilians 
have died. This has caused concern and debate about the overall benefits of this “CMT 
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complex,” and the broader implications and impacts of rooting the Chinese population’s national 
self-concept in the memory of a mythologized past and previous cultural traumas. 
 
Chinese Social Media Communication and Censorship 
In addition to nation-state politics, popular media can also create and perpetuate imagined 
communities. Chinese social media platforms intersects and intermingles with aspects of Chinese 
identity in several ways, as both a method of communication in a common language and also by 
proliferating, sharing, and rapidly spreading ideas. Engaging with works about Chinese social 
media, especially Weibo, is critical to understanding the construction and preservation of modern 
Chinese nationalism. Many Western articles on Sina Weibo tend to falsely call Weibo a Chinese 
“Twitter-like-platform” and neglect the diversified communities and viewpoints of users on 
Weibo. The Internet connects “ethnic Chinese people across national boundaries, leading to the 
formation of a transnational cultural sphere, within which the meanings of being Chinese are 
debated and cultivated.”69 Nevertheless, citizens of the PRC have ever more limited access to 
online social media and non-CCP approved new sources.  
One of the most widely used forms of social media in China is Sina Weibo, which is a 
micro-blogging platform. Sina Weibo, or simply Weibo (微博), was launched on August 14th, 
2009. After the July 2009 Urumqi riots, China blocked most of the domestic and non-China-
based microblogging services (such as Twitter and Facebook), which allowed Weibo to rise 
quickly in popularity after its introduction. The website enables users to send messages and 
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multimedia messages to one another, upload photos and videos, which can be shared, and add 
comments, photos, and videos in the comment section of posts. Sina Weibo was allowed to exist 
behind the so called “Great Firewall of China” due to adhering to Chinese censorship laws; 
however, it in its inception, it was considerably freer when compared with other Chinese social 
media websites. Nevertheless, with the Chinese government’s continued pressure to universally 
enforce internet regulations, and with the addition of new stricter cybersecurity laws, Weibo’s 
users were no longer allowed a degree of anonymity.   
 Eileen Le Han (2016) posits that Weibo is unique when compared to other social media 
platforms because it “provided a common platform for Chinese-speaking users all over the 
world” and incidentally drew “globally dispersed Chinese people closer during certain public 
events despite the existence of the Great Firewall.”70 Weibo is an event oriented platform, and 
serves a place where past memories are preserved and can remain present in the consciousness of 
users. These memories can be itemized through key search terms and hashtags which reinforces 
“mnemonic activities” and specific phrase associations with those memories.71 Additionally, 
Weibo provides a space where these memories and understandings of historic events can be 
debated and the official narrative can be challenged. However, in challenging the official 
narrative this can “also serve to reinforce a sense of nationalism and even be incorporated in the 
official discourse.”72 Official and verified Chinese media organizations which have a presence 
on Weibo have “focused on promoting nationalism during the anniversary commemoration,”73 
which “fits into the Chinese government’s nationalism project.”74 Chinese authorities have 
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begun to use social media platforms to engage with historical narratives, and promote historical 
revisionism. The contested personal and historical narratives discussed on Weibo have been 
absorbed “into the maintain stream to [legitimize] narratives of nationalism.”75  
 Le Han (2016) also provides anecdotal evidence in how Chinese scholars, journalists, and 
elites on Weibo serve as de-escalatory voices to combat excessive nationalistic tendencies. In the 
example of the 2012 China anti-Japanese demonstrations, “rational” users made comparisons to 
the Cultural Revolution to describe the violent nature of some of the protestors. Le Han’s 
anecdotal evidence is supported by the empirical evidence discovered by Cairns & Carlson 
(2016) in their study of Weibo posts during the demonstrations. Cairns & Carlson (2016) 
reported three major findings: firstly, “the censorship rate of online discussion was lower at a 
critical juncture in August than extant literature would predict.”76 Secondly, that “much of the 
netizens' anger was directed at Beijing, not Tokyo.”77 Lastly, that “more moderate voices 
appeared to counter these virulent sentiments directly after a broader swath of the public tuned in 
to online discussion of the dispute in September.”78 Cairns & Carlson (2016) suggest that since 
the dispute was still in its early stages in August, the CCP may have been more willing to 
tolerate some risk to societal order to signal its resolve to Tokyo. Cairns & Carlson (2016) also 
affirm that the CCP selectively allows nationalist protests, which appear to apply pressure to 
Beijing during international disputes, so long as protesters do not escalate their actions and turn 
against their leaders. Furthermore, their “observations raise the possibility that Beijing felt it had 
to let nationalist-minded netizens ‘blow off steam,’”79 and the protests served to direct the outlet 
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of anger elsewhere. However, by September, the demonstrations had escalated and became more 
destructive. While the CCP may not have been able (or willing) to rein in street demonstrations 
immediately, it was much more capable of tightening online censorship in order to reduce the 
spread of information about the destructive acts inflicted by the protestors. Moreover, by 
avoiding visible censorship (Roberts, 2018), when online users are aware that censorship is 
occurring, the CCP may have been trying to avoid inducing heightened information-seeking 
behaviors. 
There is “consistent and systematic censorship of content that violates long-standing 
taboos [in China] on topics such as the Cultural Revolution, the 1989 crackdown on Tiananmen 
Square protesters, Taiwanese independence, the repression of minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet, 
and the banned spiritual group Falun Gong.”80 Online publications regarding Chinese territorial 
sovereignty are highly sensitive, and as a result, are often censored if they do not align with the 
CCP’s position. As I am dealing with censorship, there are likely some limitations in the sources 
and evidence I could have potentially used, but I have taken steps to ensure that I have access to 
and have preserved various unorthodox online opinions. Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet are the 
most sensitive, because these regions are disputed and are also involved with human rights 
issues. However, based on previous censorship patterns, the level of censorship surrounding the 
territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas has taken a step closer to that of Taiwan, 
Xinjiang, and Tibet. Nevertheless, Chinese online censorship is not universal and is actually 
quite porous. According to Roberts (2018) the censorship methods employed by the Chinese 
government function more as a tax on information, by “forcing users to pay money or spend 
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more time if they want to access the censored material.”81 Roberts (2018) employs a formula of 
fear, friction, and flooding to explain censorship methods and the types of citizens whom these 
approaches are designated for. Friction, the act of increasing the costs, either in time or money, 
of accessing or disseminating information, often diverts citizens’ attention away by imposing 
barriers to information access.82 Flooding is information that is coordinated as a distraction, 
propaganda, or to sow confusion.83 Flooding competes with information that authoritarian 
governments would like to censor by diluting it and distracting from it.84 Similar to friction, 
flooding also forces the user to spend extra time finding accurate information. China’s “Great 
Firewall” and its friction and flooding can be circumvented by the use of Virtual Private 
Network (VPN), but there are economic and social costs attached to this technique. Therefore, 
the method of fear is designed for the elites who have already bypassed the friction and flooding 
methods of censorship.85 Moreover, these censorship methods drive a wedge between the elite 
and the masses, and have caused Weibo users to be “starkly apolitical” when compared to their 
elite and educated Chinese counterparts on Twitter. 86 Modern Chinese nationalism is “an elite-
led, top-down political movement,”87 and by separating the elites from the masses, the CCP 
prevents the coordination of the masses and the elites and any possible mobilization against 
government interests. 
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The South China Sea 
A majority of the sources I used to further my understanding of the South China Sea 
echoed each other on the factual information on the territorial disputes, but offered different 
frameworks for understanding the conflict. Allison (2017) uses the paradigm of Thucydides’ 
Trap, an observed pattern of international tension when a rising power threatens to displace the 
current reigning world hegemon, which often results in war, to explain Chinese motivations in 
the South China Sea. Allison (2017) asserts that Thucydides’ Trap is the best angle for 
understanding Sino-American relations in the 21st century, and parallels Xi Jinping’s and Donald 
Trump’s ambitions to make their respective countries “great again.” Furthermore, he offers 
several examples of how the United States and China could easily find themselves at war, one 
such example being conflict over the South China Sea. I partially agree with Allison over the 
global tensions that China’s rise has caused, but argue that his approach does not fully account 
for modern Chinese history, nationalism, and the patriotic education campaign. Miller (2017) 
utilizes a geopolitical and geo-economic framework for understanding the South China Sea and 
asserts that China’s “true motivation in the South China Sea is to gain strategic control of its 
shipping lanes.”88 Moreover, Miller (2017) affirms that “China’s expansionism in the South 
China Sea is part of Beijing’s grand strategy to replace the US as the dominant power in Asia.”89 
Miller (2017) also believes that “China sees “the rules-based order” as a rigged system designed 
both to contain its legitimate rise and to prop up the US imperium… [and] the US’s ‘pivot to 
Asia’ [serves as] proof.”90 I largely agree with Miller’s framework, but also seek to add a 
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framework of Chinese nationalism and education to establish a comprehensive schema for 
understanding the South China Sea. 
Alternatively, French (2017) uses examples found in China’s historical role as the 
hegemon of the Asia-Pacific region to expound upon modern happenings in China under the rule 
of Xi Jinping. Xi’s China uses its history as a seemingly benevolent and non-imperialistic 
regional ruler as justification for its desire to return to its place of former power. French (2017) 
emphasizes that Chinese historical revisionism has helped to cultivate China’s growing sense of 
national dominance and warns that Imperial China’s rule was not as benign as revisionists have 
claimed, and suspects much of the same for potential Chinese rule. As the result of China’s 
sustained and expected further outward projection of economic and military power, French 
(2017) predicts that due to impending structural challenges within China, such as the 
ramifications of the One Child Policy, China’s window to achieve its aims are closing rapidly. 
French (2017) also infers that the next decade will be turbulent for the world as China attempts 
to reassert itself in the Asia-Pacific region before its impending population problem begins to 
unravel. I mostly agree with French, but hesitate to fully brand modern Chinese historical 
narrative as a form of historical revisionism, especially when considering the “Century of 
Humiliation.” 
 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, through research on the “Chinese Dream,” the construction of modern 
Chinese expansionist nationalism, the South China Sea disputes and Chinese motivations, and 
Chinese social media communication and censorship, I have identified three foundational works 
in which this thesis seeks to expand upon. Zheng Wang’s (2014) Never Forget National 
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Humiliation: Historical memory in Chinese politics and foreign relations, Eileen Le Han’s 
(2016) Micro-blogging Memories: Weibo and collective remembering in contemporary China 
and Margaret E. Roberts’ (2018) Censored: Distraction and Diversion Inside China Great 
Firewall all are related to the scope of this thesis and provide invaluable evidence for this thesis’ 
argument, but are ultimately different from what this thesis seeks to prove. Le Han explores the 
impact of ever increasing Chinese nationalism and state-sponsored censorship on Chinese 
collective memory and historical narratives. Nevertheless, she does so within a time frame that 
does not reflect the recent legal changes to Weibo resulting from updated Chinese cyberspace 
policy. Le Han does discuss the East China Sea and 2012 protests, but does so briefly. Wang 
discusses the CCP’s role in shaping educational curriculum to cultivate external-oriented 
Chinese nationalism and how the Chinese media limits or increases the exposure of international 
incidents when it is in the interest of the CCP. However, the examples of international incidents 
he uses are a bit dated (ex: Taiwan crisis: 1995-1996, Embassy crisis: 1999, EP-3 incident: 2001, 
etc.) and the most recent example (the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games) is now over a decade old. 
Additionally, Margaret E. Roberts provides a useful framework for understanding the class 
divisions sowed by Chinese censorship methods, and how they appear on Weibo, but she does 
not use any examples of censorship within the context of the East or South China Seas. As 
Roberts (2018) takes a step back from “brainwashing or enforced symbolism, through cult like 
nationalism, religion, or ideology” she does not engage much with Chinese nationalism exhibited 
on social media platforms. 91 Additionally, by applying my new methodology of mobilization 
language to these preexisting frameworks, and building upon them, this will bridge many of the 
gaps which exist between the chosen literatures.  
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Chapter 3: Establishing Anti-Japanese Sentiment as a Transferable Framework 
Introduction 
The origins of modern Chinese nationalism date back to the late Qing dynasty, the 
Republican Era, and the early days of the People’s Republic of China. Nevertheless, China’s 
broader Imperial history is also critical for the construction of several aspects of its contemporary 
version. The Chinese Communist Party has shaped Chinese nationalism in its present form to 
ensure its legitimacy. Previously, under Mao Zedong, Chinese nationalism was “shrouded by an 
overlay of revolutionary ideology.”92 Intertwining revolutionary ideals and nationalism further 
served to cultivate loyalty towards the Party and state. However, in the post-Mao Era, as the CCP 
embarked on economic reform through 改革开放 (“reform and opening-up” gǎi gé kāi fàng), 
Chinese nationalism needed to be reformed as well. Thus, Chinese nationalism transitioned away 
from the revolutionary ideals of the past and towards aspirations for the future. Consequently, the 
CCP tied the legitimacy of its rule to its ability to ensure economic growth and national 
prosperity. The CCP has also framed itself as the “guardian of national pride” and emphasized 
the past indignities China suffered during “the Century of Humiliation.” 93 This chapter seeks to 
understand the historical roots of modern Chinese nationalism and analyze its anti-Japanese 
components and there implications. Furthermore, this chapter strives to provide a framework of 
history to convey how anti-Japanese and anti-foreign elements of contemporary Chinese 
nationalism are involved with the territorial reclamation aspects of the “Chinese Dream.” 
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Introducing the “Century of Humiliation” 
 China’s 百年国耻 (“Century of Humiliation” bǎi nián guó chǐ) period begins with 
China’s First Opium War in 1839 and concludes with the Chinese Communist Party’s victory 
over the Nationalists in the Chinese Civil War in 1949. The “Century of Humiliation” (1839-
1949) represents an age when China was subjected to interventionism and imperialism by 
Western powers and Japan. During this time, China lost much of its international prestige. 
Furthermore, China’s territorial control was reduced by a third, its imperial system collapsed, 
and the country was ravaged by rebellions, invasions, and civil war, all of which took millions of 
lives.94 The “Century of Humiliation” is part of a narrative of loss and redemption which 
legitimizes the CCP and the PRC’s one party system. As the Chinese Communist Party 
seemingly brought a conclusion to the Chinese Civil War (1949), the CCP ultimately credited 
itself as the leaders who ended China’s “Century of Humiliation”.  
The memory of China’s national humiliation persists with the use of mobilizing phrases, 
one of the most popular being: 勿忘国耻 (“never forget national humiliation” wù wàng guó chǐ). 
This mobilization language, when used in the present context, not only serves to cultivate 
nationalism, but also fosters support for the CCP. This is especially evident in instances when the 
Chinese government frames itself as willing and able to block any attempts by Western powers 
to subjugate or “humiliate” China again. This particular phrase was popularized in Chinese 
newspapers and social discourse in 1915, after Japan issued its Twenty-One Demands to 
China.95 The Twenty-One Demands were representative of the broader theme of Imperial 
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Japan’s aims to gain control over Chinese territory and limit Chinese sovereignty. Despite this 
phrase’s anti-Japanese origins, it has come to represent all of China’s suffering’s experienced 
during the course of the “Century of Humiliation,” and necessitates this chapter’s discussion of 
anti-Japanese aspects of Chinese expansionist nationalism. Additionally, by holding onto the 
memory of China’s many national humiliations, especially those at the hands of foreign powers, 
this narrative bolsters popular anti-foreign sentiment. Furthermore, by “never [forgetting 
China’s] national humiliation” at the hands of foreign powers, it becomes easier for the CCP and 
the Chinese people to justify belligerent and expansionist actions on the international stage. 
 Contemporary Chinese nationalism commemorates China's historical weakness, but also 
celebrates the glories of its imperial past. Nevertheless, the negative image which arises when 
listing China’s faults can be directly attributed to the discourse of China's Century of National 
Humiliation.96 As the “Century of Humiliation” spans a considerable amount of time, especially 
in regards to the evolution of Chinese nationalism, I will address events which have indirectly 
and directly shaped different aspects of contemporary Chinese nationalism. The facets of 
Chinese nationalism which the “Century of Humiliation” contributed to are anti-Japanese, anti-
Imperialist, and anti-Western sentiments. This chapter addresses anti-Japanese and anti-
Imperialist sentiments, while the subsequent chapter addresses anti-Western and anti-Imperialist 
sentiments. 
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Anti-Japanese Sentiment 
I have chosen to highlight anti-Japanese sentiment because I have noticed similar 
patterns, in both the construction of Chinese national identity and China’s response to Japan’s 
claims over disputed island territory, to the South China Sea disputes. This closely mirrors the 
construction of Chinese identity in regards to the South China Sea and the subsequent response 
to foreign interference to China’s “historic” territorial claims in the region. China’s Nine-Dash 
Line, which serves as a demarcation line for its territorial claims within the South China Sea, is 
an issue of history. In accordance in the United Nations Convention on the Law and the Sea, 
“historical rights” (existing or manufactured) are insufficient for grating sovereignty within 
another state’s 12 nautical miles of territorial waters and 200 nautical miles of exclusive 
economic zone. The South China Sea, and its vast undersea resources, have been deemed 
necessary for the revitalization of China by Xi Jinping and the CCP, and have been tied to 
China’s imperial past. As China’s status in the South China Sea has been increasingly linked to a 
matter of national pride, I have noticed parallels between China’s and Japan’s disputed territorial 
claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. China has linked the dispute to historical injustices 
China endured under the “Century of Humiliation” and has framed the issue as one of national 
pride. This framework can be further applied to the South China Sea. 
 
The First and Second Sino-Japanese Wars 
Through the centuries, northeastern China and its natural resources had been sought after 
by many, and during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, northeastern China became of 
particular interest to the Japanese. The railways built throughout the region by the Russians 
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provided a vast transportation network, and made northeastern China a promising potential 
resource supplier to fuel Japan’s planned expansion throughout Asia. Japan already had a vested 
economic interest in northeastern China, and the military means to influence the region. Thus, 
when the opportunity to solidify their control over the region arose, they took it, and Japan’s 
Kwantung Army invaded northeastern China on September 18, 1931. Japanese political interests 
in northeastern China were tied to its geographical location between Korea and Russia, and its 
potential to serve as a base to further Japanese influence in Asia and a buffer against 
Russian/Soviet incursion.  
The First-Sino Japanese War from 1894-1895 began over the right to influence Korea, 
and with their newly modernized military, the Japanese easily triumphed over the Chinese. The 
war was formally ended with the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ceded Japan the Liaodong 
Peninsula, in addition to Taiwan and the Penghu Islands. Nevertheless, “the combined powers of 
Russia, Germany, and France demanded a change to the terms” and “Japan was forced to cede 
the Liaodong Peninsula to Russia.”97 Russia later obtained “the right to establish the Chinese 
Eastern Railway through a secret treaty in 1896 with China,” and in 1898, Russia “leased Port 
Arthur and Dairen at the tip of the Liaodong Peninsula” to construct a southern branch of this 
very railway. 98 Russia’s activities in northeastern China and its designs on Korea would later 
come in direct conflict with Japan’s own imperialistic plans for establishing a sphere of influence 
in this region, and culminated in the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War. Japan’s victory in the 
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) ended in 1905 with the Treaty of Portsmouth, which returned 
the Liaodong Peninsula to China, ceded half of Sakhalin Island and control of the South 
                                                          
97 Iokibe, M., & Minohara, T. (Eds.). (2017). The History of US-Japan Relations: From Perry to the Present. 
Springer. Page 26. 
98 Ibid. Page 27. 
Lydia Field 47 
 
Manchuria Railway and its mining concessions to Japan.99 After the conclusion of the 
Portsmouth Peace Conference, Japan was able to “gain recognition over exclusive control of the 
Korean Peninsula as well as newly acquired rights in southern Manchuria, such as Port Arthur, 
Dairen, and the Southern Manchurian Railway,” and established the Kwantung Army in 1906 to 
guard its newly acquired railways. 100 While the surrounding land was Chinese territory, the 
Kwantung Army was responsible for protecting the railways themselves and the neighboring few 
feet of land on either sides of the tracks which made up the South Manchurian Railway Zone. 
Under the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan was allowed to keep a standing army in northeastern 
China, which created problems, as the leaders of the Kwantung Army began to act of their own 
accord.  
Over the following two decades, the Kwantung Army had observed a resurgence of 
Chinese nationalism and increasing anti-Japanese sentiment, and watched as the Chinese 
Nationalist government to the south, under Chiang Kai-shek, began to strengthen and reunify 
China. All the while, the Soviet Union to the north continued to gain power. In addition to their 
position being squeezed and potentially threatened from both the north and south, “operating the 
railway and the coal mines owned by the railway company posed enormous financial hardship” 
to Japan.101 In 1931, The Kwantung Army acted “autonomously to provoke a crisis from which 
they hoped to benefit,” by staging a bombing; however, this incident would later have much 
broader consequences. 102 On September 18th, 1931 a Japanese Kwantung Army soldier 
detonated a bomb on a section of train track near Mukden (present day Shenyang). The 
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Kwantung Army placed the responsibility of the bombing on alleged Chinese dissidents and 
revolutionaries, and this event which later became known as the Mukden Incident or 九一八事
变, served as both the excuse and catalyst for a full-scale Japanese invasion of northeastern 
China. By the beginning of March 1932, “the Japanese zone of occupation had declared itself an 
independent state.”103 The Japanese army easily invaded northeastern China, and established the 
puppet state of Manchukuo. Consequently, the Imperial Japanese Army pressed further into 
China, and on July 7th, 1937 began the Second Sino-Japanese War. 
During the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) millions of Chinese perished; 
however, the more precise estimates are still disputed. The legacy of the “War of Resistance 
against Japan” (抗日战争, kàng rì zhàn zhēng) still causes strain to Sino-Japanese relations, 
especially certain events which occurred during the course of the war. Such events include the 
Nanjing Massacre, biological warfare research conducted on Chinese civilians at Unit 731, the 
Japanese use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in warfare, comfort women, etc. The 
Nanjing Massacre and human experimentation committed at Unit 731 both contribute to modern 
Chinese nationalism. The Nanjing Massacre remains a point of contention between Japan and 
China and the total death toll estimates and overall impact are disputed by both nations. After the 
fall of Shanghai, Imperial Japanese troops marched and fought their way southward to the 
Chinese capital in Nanjing. On December 13, 1937, Nanjing fell, and in the following six weeks, 
Japanese soldiers committed mass rape and mass murder against Chinese citizens, and looted the 
city.104 The Nanjing Massacre was a coordinated act of brutality against a civilian population, in 
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which not even babies and children were spared, and soldiers engaged in “killing competitions” 
to see who could kill more Chinese.105 Tensions remain over the number of deaths, as the CCP 
maintains that 300,000 people perished, while most Japanese scholars estimate between 100,000-
200,000.106 Furthermore, some Japanese nationalists and revisionists historians suggest that the 
Nanjing Massacre was fabricated by the Chinese government for political gain, which adds 
further nationalist fervor and strife to already painful and divisive issue in Sino-Japanese 
relations.107  
 
Humiliating History in the National Narrative 
In addition to the Chinese educational shift in 1991 to emphasize the “Century of 
Humiliation,” the Chinese Communist Party has made strides “to construct memory sites and use 
them for ideological reeducation.”108 In the words of Peter Sugar, it is important to remember 
that “there is no comer on the globe where the leaders of…state do not constantly use all the 
means of communication their disposal to foster nationalism, [as this is] the state-supporting 
loyalty,” and the narratives constructed around these locations served this purpose for the leaders 
of the CCP. 109 Incidentally, yearly field trips to these sites have been incorporated into school 
curriculum and helps to cultivate Chinese patriotism. To further encourage broader population 
visitation to the sites, the CCP launched a “Red Tourism” campaign. More than 400 million 
Chinese people traveled to various red tourism locations from 2004-2007, and the Unit 731 
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museum is one such location. 110 My visit to the Unit 731 Museum actually coincided with a 
Chinese high school tour group, and some of my most vivid memories of the exhibits are due to 
how the students’ responded to them. 
 
Transitioning to the South China Sea 
 My desire in addressing the anti-Japanese aspect of modern expansionist Chinese 
nationalism, is to provide a framework for how the CCP has shaped distant maritime territorial 
disputes to appear vital to preserving Chinese national pride. The fault lines in Sino-Japanese 
relations are a consequence of history, but the CCP has weaponized this tragic history in the 
form of expansionist nationalism. The CCP has shaped the loss of, or inability to regain, territory 
lost during “the Century of Humiliation” as a historical insult at the hands of those who have 
already historically wronged China. Nevertheless, as China seeks its national rejuvenation, the 
Chinese people seek to reassert themselves as the regional hegemon in the Asia-Pacific. 
However, by centering modern Chinese history on the demoralizations of the “Century of 
Humiliation,” the Chinese Communist Party must not bring any further “humiliations” to China. 
Consequently, the CCP has become a prisoner of the nationalism it created, and it cannot fail in 
defending its claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and its militarization endeavors in the South 
China Sea, because the “national rejuvenation” has been tied to CCP legitimacy. 
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Chapter 4: The Shadows of History and its Echoes Today 
As mentioned in previous chapters, in addition to anti-Japanese sentiment, the “Century 
of Humiliation” has also fostered anti-imperialist, anti-foreign, and anti-Western feelings, all of 
which are still evident in modern Chinese nationalism. As I have already elaborated on the 
events which cultivated anti-Japanese sentiment and their impact on Sino-Japanese relations, this 
chapter seeks to highlight the anti-Imperialist and anti-Western elements of Chinese nationalism 
and expand upon my established framework. Furthermore, this chapter serves to convey how 
certain collective traumas sustained during the “Century of Humiliation” at the hands of foreign 
powers have been incorporated into Chinese national consciousness and are further executed in 
the South China Sea. Contemporary Chinese nationalism selectively recalls the glories of its 
past, but also serves to commemorate China's historical weakness. However, by centering 
modern Chinese history on the demoralizations of “the Century of Humiliation,” the Chinese 
Communist Party must save face and cannot bring any further “humiliations” upon the Chinese 
people. As demonstrated by China’s increasingly aggressive posture towards US Freedom of 
Navigation Operations in the South China Sea, and other foreign encroachment towards islands 
which its views as part of its territorial sovereignty, the CCP is at the will of the nationalism it 
created, and it cannot fail in its expansionist military endeavors in the South China Sea.  
 
Returning to the “Century of Humiliation” 
 In the previous chapter, I articulated how specific events and interactions between China 
and Japan, situated within the broader “Century of Humiliation,” have contributed to Chinese 
national consciousness. Besides anti-Japanese feelings, these incidents also fostered residual, 
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anti-imperialist and anti-foreign sentiments which span across cultural memories of the “Century 
of Humiliation.” Japanese-ness came to represent foreign influence and imperialism within a 
modern Chinese context. While sharing many overlapping themes and consequences with other 
events within the “Century of Humiliation,” the interactions with the Japanese did not give arise 
to anti-Western feelings within China. This chapter seeks to outline the impact of Western 
dealings with China during the “Century of Humiliation,” as historic “humiliations” and their 
collective memories, and resulting nationalism serve as a framework for contextualizing the 
South China Sea. 
  
The First Opium War (1839-1842)  
 The First Opium War was the result of a long-standing conflict between China and Great 
Britain over issues of trade and sovereignty.111 British demand for Chinese goods continued to 
grow over the course of the 19th century; however, the Chinese largely remained uninterested in 
a majority of British exports. Furthermore, China had no desire nor need to reorganize its 
imperial tribute trade system to adhere to the European model. Eventually, the British discovered 
a product that was popular on the Chinese market: opium. British traders and smugglers began to 
take advantage of the preexisting opium market in China, and exponential levels of the drug 
began to illegally enter China. By 1838, addiction levels had soared and millions were addicted. 
The opium problem plagued all levels of society, and a significant number of officials and 
military men had developed the habit. After much debate within the Daoguang Emperor’s court 
over potential legalization and taxation methods to regulate and reduce the illicit trade, the 
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hardline faction ultimately prevailed. Thus, Lin Zexu was given an imperial commission and 
appointed to halt the illegal opium trade in Guangzhou. Lin quickly arrested Chinese opium 
dealers and eventually confiscated foreign firms’ opium stocks, all of which was ultimately 
destroyed by being thrown into the sea.112 In response to this, the British government dispatched 
a military force to China and in the course of the ensuing conflict, the Chinese discovered that 
Britain had amassed the needed military might to force China to accept its terms.  
 The waging of the First Opium War thoroughly conveyed the vast degree in which 
British naval and technological capabilities overshadowed that of the more numerous Qing. 
Furthermore, the ease in which the British triumphed greatly damaged the prestige of the ruling 
Qing dynasty. The lasting legacy of the First Opium War can be found in the signing of China’s 
first “unequal treaty,” which formally ended the war. In the words of both Sun Yat-sen and Mao 
Ze-dong, the provisions outlined within the Treaty of Nanjing began China’s transformation into 
a “semi-colonial” country.113 The Treaty of Nanjing114 abolished the preexisting framework for 
foreign trade under the Canton and tributary states systems and established Guangzhou, Xiamen, 
Fuzhou, Ningbo, and Shanghai as “treaty ports” open for foreign trade. Furthermore, it 
established static tariff rates for the trade in the treaty ports and allowed for British diplomats to 
communicate directly with local Chinese customs officials. The treaty also established most-
favored nation policies and granted extraterritoriality to foreign nationals. The Qing government 
was forced to pay indemnities, in total $21 million as both war reparations and compensation for 
lost and damaged property. Lastly, Hong Kong was ceded to Great Britain. The Qing 
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government followed similar patterns when appeasing Western powers over the following 
decades. Consequently, 割地赔款 (gē dì péi kuǎn) “ceding territory and paying indemnities” 
became the forced primary model for interaction and diplomacy between Western powers and 
the Qing.115  
 Modern China has memorialized this culturally traumatic event by building the Opium 
War Museum at the location where Lin Zexu confiscated the British opium.116 Museums and 
monuments grant a window into how history is remembered by different groups, and allows for 
narrative to be inserted into its retelling. While originally built in 1985, before the state 
sponsored educational shift, the Opium War Museum serves a similar role to other ideological 
education sites: fostering nationalism. Before entering the museum, visitors are greeted by a 
sculpture of two hands breaking an opium pipe. The museum offers this explanation for the 
intriguing design of the monument: 
“The big hands are symbolic of the power of Chinese people to resist the foreign 
invasions and the spirit of the Chinese people cannot be insulted. The broken opium 
pipe is symbolic of the ultimate failure of the imperialists’ invasion crimes. The 
sculpture is telling us not to forget this part of history and the Chinese nation cannot 
be insulted.”117 (Translation courtesy of Zheng Wang.) 
 
I highlight this language, as it offers unique insight into how the remembrance of a 
historical trauma cultivates nationalism. This rhetoric emphasizes China’s national strength and 
pride, past and present, and accentuates the collective effort to resist foreign influence, 
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incursion, and imperialism. Furthermore, it stresses the remembrance of this cultural trauma 
while stating that the present, modern Chinese nation, under the rule of the CCP, will never again 
suffer the same injustices. The phrase “cannot be insulted” is used twice, referring to both the 
Chinese people and Chinese nation-state. This language is associated with Chinese anti-foreign, 
anti-Western, and anti-imperialist protests and condemnations, and was a popular rallying cry of 
Chinese students protesting the 1999 US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.118 
Furthermore, this language and it sentiment is rooted in the nationalism spawned from the 
“Century of Humiliation,” as seen with the translation of the Opium War Museum monument 
explanation. 
 中国人不可欺，中华不可辱 (zhōng guó rén bù kě qī, zhōng huá bù kě rǔ) is usually 
translated into English as “the Chinese people cannot be bullied, China cannot be insulted.” 
However, I think this translation is slightly inaccurate, as it diminishes the overall impact of the 
statement. The grammatical structure of this statement is rooted in Classical Chinese poetry 
forms, which not only causes it to be difficult to translate, but also demands that those who use 
and understand this phrase are highly educated. 欺 qī can be translated as “to bully,” but also can 
be translated as: “to deceive,” “to cheat,” and “to take unfair advantage of.” Furthermore, 辱 rǔ 
can be translated as “to insult,” but also can be translated as “to disgrace,” “to dishonor,” or “to 
bring humiliation to.” These words are all synonyms in Chinese, but in English have differing 
degrees of severity. Additionally, “cannot” is an acceptable translation for 不可 bù kě, but 
“should not” or “must not” are more suitable. Moreover, in the way in which this rallying phrase 
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is often incorporated into patriotic statements greatly suggests that China should not be slighted, 
and that it will not allow itself to be.  
My translation of 中国人不可欺，中华不可辱 (zhōng guó rén bù kě qī, zhōng huá bù kě 
rǔ) is: “the Chinese people must not be taken advantage of, China cannot [and will not] be 
humiliated.” This phrase and its variations receive a spike in usage, both online and in physical 
protest contexts, when China has been criticized or when Chinese relations with other foreign 
powers sour. The environment of nationalism in China, and especially in its online community, 
has greatly reduced the possibility of reproach for Chinese governmental policies, the CCP, and 
the Chinese commemoration of history. Bilateral and multilateral dealings with other foreign 
powers that have unfavorable outcomes for China have been construed as “insults” to China, 
because of the historic shadow of imperialism over these interactions. Foreign disapproval of the 
CCP’s domestic and foreign policies and any attempted foreign interference with the execution 
of these policies, especially in regards to Chinese territorial sovereignty, results in swift criticism 
from Chinese government and ministry spokespeople. In these national condemnations, the 
spokesperson will they often recount China’s painful memory of history as justification for 
China’s stance on the issue. Such examples include the ruling of the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal in 
favor of the Philippines, the United States’ Freedom of Navigation programs in the South China 
Sea, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute, etc. I will elaborate on this in greater detail in the 
following chapter, especially in regards to how the climate for policy dissent and Chinese 
scholarly self-criticism has been restricted on Weibo due to surging expansionist Chinese 
nationalism.  
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The Second Opium War (1856-1860) 
 The initial indemnities, ceded territory, and extraterritoriality provisions granted under 
the Treaty of Nanjing proved to be insufficient for fulfilling British interests. Since the treaty had 
not directly addressed the legality of the opium trade, the British were still forced to smuggle the 
illicit drug into China. Ultimately, the British objective in fighting the Second Opium War was to 
formally legalize the opium trade in China. Due to various acts of Chinese violence against 
foreign nationals, who were now seemingly exempt from all Qing laws, the British gained the 
pretext to launch the Second Opium War.119 Furthermore, with the murder of French missionary, 
Father Auguste Chapdelaine, France and Britain joined forces in their campaign against the 
Qing.120 Paralleling the First Opium War, the combined naval and technological capabilities of 
the Anglo-French forces overshadowed that of more numerous Qing, and they were dealt a swift 
defeat. However, after the Anglo-French expedition marched on Beijing, causing the Emperor to 
flee, they remained for a month and went about destroying and looting the Old Summer 
Palace.121 Many of the looted Chinese relics and zodiac fountain heads remain overseas and in 
foreign museums, which still causes diplomatic issues today. UNESCO has estimated that 1.67 
million Chinese relics are held by 200-plus museums in 47 countries.122  
The CCP has allowed the ruins of the Old Summer Palace remain, and little to no effort 
has been made to rebuild the site. The ruins of the Old Summer Palace stand as a reminder and a 
symbol of the physical and metaphorical destruction of Chinese culture at the hands of foreign 
imperialists. The ruins of the Old Summer Palace is popular location to visit in Beijing and 
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serves as a location for “patriotic education” and constructing modern Chinese self-concept. 
Nevertheless, the story of humiliations continues and despite the destruction of the Old Summer 
Palace, the Qing were made to sign another “unequal treaty.” 
  As a result of the asymmetric power structure, the Treaty of Tianjin123 also provided 
provisions to Russia and the United States, who were not even belligerents during the Second 
Opium War, in addition to Great Britain and France. The Treaty of Tianjin allowed for Russia, 
France, Great Britain, and the United States to station diplomats in Beijing, opened eleven more 
“treaty ports” to foreign trade, granted the right of free navigation for foreign vessels on the 
Yangtze River, and the right of foreigners to freely travel throughout all of China. In addition, 
more indemnities were to be paid, Kowloon was ceded to the British, and territories in Outer 
Manchuria were ceded to Russia. Ceding territory, paying indemnities, and surrendering 
sovereign rights are a recurring theme related to the “unequal treaties.” The legacy of 
imperialism has shaped much of modern Chinese rhetoric around the measure of the success of 
China’s “national rejuvenation,” as it has been framed as the government’s ability to regain lost 
territory and reinforce its territorial claims.  
 
The Boxer Rebellion 
 The Boxer Rebellion was a reactionary, proto-nationalist, local resistance movement 
against the rapid expansion of Western influence in China.124 From 1898-1901, the “Boxers” 
operated a violent, anti-imperialist, and anti-Christian movement, which sought to “Support the 
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Qing, Destroy the Foreign” (扶清灭洋 fú qīng miè yáng).125 The “Boxers” converged on Beijing, 
and violence broke out against foreigners and Chinese Christians.126 In response, the Eight-
Nation Alliance, in which the United States and Japan were included, dispatched troops to 
Beijing in August 1900 to suppress the movement. Upon the troop’s arrival, the Empress 
Dowager and her officials were forced to flee, and once again, China’s capital and imperial 
palaces were occupied by foreign troops and ransacked.127 The Qing dynasty was forced to sign 
the Boxer Protocol of 1901, which included provisions for China to pay an indemnity of 450 
million taels of silver, and also granted the eight powers a “Legation Quarter,” an area of Beijing 
which functioned as sovereign foreign territory within the capital.128 During the “Century of 
Humiliation,” China was repeatedly invaded by foreign imperialists, forced to appease these 
foreign powers by paying large indemnities and ceding them sovereign Chinese territory, and 
forced to adopt Western and European models of social and economic convention. Ultimately, 
these historic consequences of imperialism are tied to the destruction of China’s glorified 
imperial past, and the CCP will not allow the Chinese people to forget this. 
 
Conclusion 
In writing these chapters recounting Chinese history, it is not my intention to understate 
the magnitude of the tragic cultural events which occurred during China’s “Century of 
Humiliation,” as many Chinese claims about the broader motivations of the West and western 
interference are valid. Rather, these chapters serve to voice my concerns over how modern 
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criticism of China and the CCP, from the West, have been rejected on grounds of imperialist 
intent. The legacy of imperialism and foreign intervention China experienced during the 
“Century of Humiliation” have firmly rooted themselves in the discourse surrounding Chinese 
nationalism, causing modern Chinese identity to reorient itself towards resistance. The language 
employed by the Chinese Communist Party has historically been steeped in revolutionary 
rhetoric. However, by wrapping itself within and shielding itself with the traumas in China’s 
historical narrative, it has supercharged the explosivity of Chinese nationalism. Within the 
Chinese context, “resistance” towards foreign influence and imperialism has military 
connotations, and this has increasingly transformed into calls for action against those who 
oppose and/or hinder China’s rise and “national rejuvenation.” Furthermore, with Xi Jinping’s 
centralization of power and China’s increasing in-life and online censorship, the presence of 
calming and tension easing voices have largely been (legally) eliminated from the conversation. 
Unlike the critical and diffusing online scholarly response to the 2012 Senkaku/Diaoyu islands 
protests, the nationalist fueled pressure surrounding Chinese military expansion in the South 
China Sea and broader “the Chinese Dream” has only continued to rise, and may boil over.  
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Chapter 5: Chinese Cyber Nationalism and the East and South China Seas 
The CCP’s Regulation of Weibo and Collective Memory 
The micro-blogging platform Sina Weibo, or simply Weibo (微博), is one of the most 
widely used forms of social media in China and currently has 445 million active users.129 Sina 
Weibo was created as a Chinese-based alternative to Western social media websites, and was 
allowed to remain operational due to its compliance with Chinese censorship laws. Despite this, 
Sina Weibo remained considerably freer than other Chinese social media websites. This degree 
of freedom was due to a level of anonymity afforded to its users. The decreased level of user 
accountability created an online space where Weibo users could contest censorship, engage in 
free speech, and even criticize the government to an extent. Nevertheless, Chinese cyberspace 
censorship over its population has improved over the years and has been better adapted to fit and 
monitor the micro-blogging sphere. Furthermore, with the Chinese government’s continued 
pressure of Sina to universally enforce CAC internet regulations, Weibo no longer affords the 
limited freedoms of its early “golden years.” 
The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) was founded in 2014 and is linked with 
patterns of increased censorship and ever decreasing civil liberties seen under the leadership of 
Xi Jinping’s administration. The CAC has ushered in sweeping changes to China’s digital 
sphere; with some of the most stringent regulations beginning to take effect in and after 2017. As 
of June, 2017, the CAC has required online news broadcasters to be licensed by the Chinese 
government to publish news on the internet and on social media platforms.130 Furthermore, the 
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CAC detailed that the types of media which require licenses for the distribution of news 
included: “websites, applications, forums, blogs, microblogs, public accounts, instant messaging 
tools, and internet broadcasts.”131 This enhances the government’s control of limiting public 
engagement and functions to construct more favorable political narratives. Also, CAC 
regulations released on August 25, 2017 required that Chinese social media users had to verify 
their accounts with their real names, effective October 1, 2017.132 These measures were passed 
just ahead of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. During China’s 19th 
Party Congress, Xi Jinping began his second term as the leader of China and cemented his legacy 
by having his official Thought enshrined into the Party’s Constitution, and took steps to 
centralize his power and role in policymaking decisions.133 The new CAC regulations prompted 
Weibo to demand that its users verify their accounts with their real identities by September 15, 
2017.134 These regulations greatly diminish the dissemination of public comments and criticisms 
of the government, as well as the role of citizen journalism, within an increasingly limited 
environment.   
Before the increased censorship of social media platforms, Sina Weibo provided a space 
where memories and understandings of historic events could be debated and the official 
government narrative could be challenged by users. Previously, debates on history were limited 
to scholars or small groups of interested and passionate individuals. However, after the 
introduction of social media platforms which allowed for broad audience participation, both the 
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scholarly and informal debates on the CCP’s recount of history gained a much wider visibility.  
Aided by the ease of information dissemination through Weibo, “the monolithic official version 
of the past, the one told in history textbooks, [began] to face questions.”135 However, just as the 
netizens and scholars before them, Chinese authorities also began to use social media platforms 
to engage with historical accounts, and greatly promoted the CCP’s desired historical narrative. 
This caused some of the contested and extreme personal and historical narratives discussed on 
Weibo to be absorbed “into the mainstream to [legitimize] narratives of nationalism.”136 
Furthermore, after increased government engagement, attempts made to challenge the official 
narrative “also serve[d] to reinforce a sense of nationalism,” as they were portrayed as 
unpatriotic acts and later censored. 137   
Weibo is an events oriented platform, and functions as a place where past memories are 
preserved and remain present in the consciousness of users. These online memories can be 
categorized, recalled, and engaged with by the use of key term searches and hashtags. When 
engaging with Weibo posts about memories and broader Chinese historical narrative, the 
presence of “mobilizing mnemonic activities” greatly increases. 138 These activities usually 
appear in the form of words related to the preservation of memory, such as “remember,” 
“commemorate,” and “do not forget.” Many Chinese naming conventions for historical events, 
especially those tied to war, often use dates and the word “incident” (事变 shì biàn) rather than 
list the location and the event that occurred there. Examples of such “incidents” include: the 
Mukden Incident (九一八事变 “September 18 Incident”), the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (七七
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事变 “July 7 Incident”), the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade (五八事变 “May 7 
Incident”), etc. This naming convention firmly grounds these events in an annual temporal 
space, which promotes commemoration, similar to how the September 11th attacks are also 
simply referred to as 9/11 in the United States. 
 
National Heroes, Anniversaries, and Celebrations of Nationalism 
On anniversaries of important dates in modern Chinese history, verified news sources, 
scholars, and ordinary citizen users memorialize the events and those impacted through their 
Weibo posts. This engagement with the past greatly increases the prevalence of mobilizing 
mnemonic activities, and can even cause the topic to trend on all of Weibo. Official and verified 
Chinese media organizations which have a presence on Weibo have “focused on promoting 
nationalism during the anniversary commemoration,” and this practice has been amplified after 
the introduction of the online media publication licensing requirement enacted in 2017.139 Figure 
1 shows an example of this practice in the form of a Weibo post from China Youth Daily with 
additional civilian user commentary. China Youth Daily is the official newspaper for the 
Communist Youth League of China, and the CYLC is a youth movement run by the CCP. In this 
post it commemorates the anniversary of the Nanjing Massacre with graphic images of Chinese 
victims of the massacre and uses nationalistic, mobilizing language.  
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Translation: 
Small Black Bench: “The reason why Chinese people are Chinese is because everyone in this country bears 
such a history. The history of weakness cannot be forgotten; the shame of humiliating the country must not 
be forgotten; the blood of [our] ancestors, [we] dare not forget!” 
China Youth Daily: “[Irrefutable evidence! [We] cannot forget! [We] must not forget! [We] dare not 
forget!] Today is the fifth Nanjing Massacre Memorial Day, the country’s first local legislation for national 
memorial service the “Nanjing National Memorial Ceremony Protection Regulations” also came into force 
today. There are fewer than 100 survivors of the Nanjing Massacre on the books, witnesses will grow old, 
but history cannot be forgotten! Because some people have forgotten, so we must remember: today, please 
observe a moment of silence in tribute of the compatriot victims!”  
 
Figure 3: 12/3/2018 Weibo post from China Youth Daily commemorating the Nanjing Massacre, with additional user 
reposting and comments 
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Another such example of the government’s effort to cultivate Chinese nationalism is 
through the memorialization of past and the construction of new “national heroes” 民族英雄 
(mín zú yīng xióng). Under the guidance of Xi Jinping and his administration, China’s legislature 
passed resolutions to create multiple new national observances in 2014: “Victory Day,” “Nanjing 
Memorial Day,” and “Martyrs’ Day.” September 3 was designated “Victory Day of the Chinese 
People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression,” December 13 was designated a 
National Memorial Day to commemorate the Nanjing Massacre, and September 30 was later 
designated as “Martyrs’ Day.” Victory Day and the Nanjing Memorial Day both serve to 
institutionalize anti-Japanese sentiment, promote Chinese nationalism, and ensure loyalty to the 
Party by celebrating the CCP’s role in defeating Imperial Japan.140 Martyrs’ Day falls the day 
before the National Day of the PRC, which commemorates the founding of the PRC. Martyrs’ 
Day is similar to the two new previously mentioned national observances, but is much broader in 
its scope as it serves to honor all “who died serving the nation, beginning with the First Opium 
War in 1840… [and includes] Kuomintang soldiers who died during the Second Sino-Japanese 
War.”141 To mark these national remembrance days, President Xi Jinping and other state leaders 
annually attend a high-profile ceremony in Tiananmen Square, schools are ordered to organize 
commemorative events to “guide the young students to follow socialist core values,” and the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs announces the names of those who are honored as martyrs.142 These 
national observances are designed to encourage nationalistic feelings and celebrate all those who 
died resisting foreign invaders during the “Century of Humiliation.”  
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The CCP has taken the institutionalization of these holidays and nationalism a step 
further, and in 2018 the CCP began issuing laws and regulations regarding their observance. 
“The Nanjing National Memorial Ceremony Protection Regulations” (mentioned in Figure 1) 
introduced an obligatory city-wide “minute of silence during the memorial ceremony” and 
provided provisions for prosecuting those who engage “in speeches that distort or deny the facts 
of the Nanjing Massacre.”143 These regulations increase government control over the collective 
memory and commemoration of the event and greatly impacts the nationalistic narrative 
surrounding the Nanjing Massacre. Additionally, the “Heroes and Martyrs Protection Act” 
threatens unnamed “administrative penalties” or even “criminal sanctions” against those who 
“damage memorials, [and/or] insult or slander heroes and martyrs.”144 These laws effectively 
make it illegal to even suggest that the CCP’s narrative of the individuals it memorializes and 
history surrounding them may not be founded in complete truth. Furthermore, the passage of 
these laws were motivated by the increase in “people in China [who] have slandered or 
derogated heroes and martyrs via the Internet, magazines and other media in the name of 
‘academic freedom,’ ‘restoring history,’ or ‘probing into details.’”145 By attempting to quell all 
forms of online dissent, this thoroughly conveys the lengths to which Xi Jinping and the CCP are 
willing to go to safeguard the legitimacy of the Party and promote expansionist Chinese 
nationalism.  
Heroic stories of past sacrifice and suffering undertaken by martyrs and individuals for 
the good of the country, especially in regard to the struggle for national independence and 
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endeavors against foreign aggression, “fit into the Chinese government’s nationalism project” 
and furthers its agenda. 146 These posts often take the form of calls to “remember” and “never 
forget” fallen national heroes as well as the millions of Chinese who died during the various wars 
encompassed by the “Century of Humiliation.” The government has been promoting Chinese 
military exploits and the accomplishments of PLA service members through social media. This 
has further fueled expansionist nationalism and Chinese expansionist feelings involving disputed 
territory. However, sometimes these posts, especially from more nationalistic users, can make a 
call for indirect or direct action in the present. Usually, these patriotic calls to action is a 
preventative measure to ensure that China is not “humiliated” again at the hands of foreign 
powers. Nevertheless, in some of the most extreme examples, users have suggested and even 
called for PLA military action against nations who have “insulted China.” 
 
The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute 
 In 2012, Shintaro Ishihara, the right-wing governor of Tokyo, announced his decision to 
purchase the privately-owned Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea on behalf of the 
local Japanese government, which sparked large-scale public protests across China. This group 
of eight small uninhabited islands and rocks located in the East China Sea are contested by three 
nations: China, Japan, and Taiwan. The Chinese and Taiwanese refer to the islands as the Diaoyu 
and both consider themselves to be their rightful owners. The Japanese refer to the islands as the 
Senkaku and have purchased three of the islands. Despite their small and uninhabited nature, 
these islands are at the forefront of one the most explosive national security conflicts in the Asia-
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Pacific region. The disputed territory not only lies near key shipping lanes and rich fishing 
grounds, but is also believed to contain considerable undersea oil and gas reserves, which has 
greatly increased the geopolitical consequences regarding the islands’ territorial sovereignty and 
maritime boundaries. Consequently, when Japan took steps to formally claim the islands, many 
Chinese people and Chinese government officials reacted severely.  
 In response to Japan’s plan to buy and nationalize the Diaoyu Islands, the PRC’s Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Liu Weimin stated that “the Diaoyu Island and its affiliated 
islands have been China's inherent territory since ancient times, for which China has indisputable 
historical and jurisprudential evidence… [and that] the Chinese Government will continue to 
take necessary measures to resolutely safeguard its sovereignty over the Diaoyu Island and its 
affiliated islands.”147 China’s alleged proof of “indisputable historical” evidence dating back to 
ancient times of their claims of territorial sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands mirrors their 
“historical claims” or “historical rights” over other disputed islands in the South China Sea. 
Paralleling the historical arguments which the Chinese have attempted to use to contest several 
groups of islands in the South China Sea, these claims have a precedent of failing as they fall 
within a framework of international law which favors geography over history. The arguments in 
support for China’s “historic rights” over the South China Sea are based in China’s imperial 
history as the regional hegemon of the Asia-Pacific. Modern Chinese leaders have extended 
Chinese maritime territory to include that of nearly every former vassal state which offered 
tribute to the Chinese Emperor under the tributary state system. These leaders have also 
attempted to use China’s former position in the region as justification for its claims within the 
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framework of UNCLOS. However, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are unique, for while subject to 
UNCLOS regulations, they are also subject to acquisition, which includes issues of treaties and 
occupation. The issue of acquisition is vital to China’s claim over the Diaoyu Islands as it is 
rooted in interactions between Japan and China during the “Century of Humiliation.” For the 
purpose of this thesis, this serves to provide evidence for how the “Century of Humiliation,” and 
its nationalism, have been used to justify Chinese territorial expansion.  
 After China lost the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and signed the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki, it signified Imperial Japan’s first successful endeavor with imperialism and the 
first use of “an unequal treaty” by an East Asian country against another. The loss of the war and 
the Treaty of Shimonoseki caused China to suffer many “humiliations,” and fostered the 
beginnings of a national reckoning within China. The provision of the Treaty of Shimonoseki 
which pertains to the modern territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands was the ceding 
of Taiwan to Japan. Article 2 (b) of the Treaty of Shimonoseki states that China must cede “the 
island of Formosa [Taiwan], together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said island 
of Formosa” to Japan. 148 The Treaty of Shimonoseki makes no direct mention of the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, but China maintains that these islands were considered to be a part of 
Taiwan by the Qing court.149 Conversely, Japan maintains that the reason the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands were not directly mentioned in the Treaty of Shimonoseki was that the Senkaku Islands 
were incorporated into Japan’s territory by exercising its rights of “acquisition through 
occupation” based on the legal principle of terra nullius, three months prior to the signing of the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki.150 Intriguingly, the Cairo Declaration stated that "all the territories Japan 
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has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa [Taiwan] and the Pescadores, shall be 
restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she 
has taken by violence and greed."151 Therefore, the CCP government asserts that as the Cairo 
Declaration was carried out by the Potsdam Declaration and the Japanese Instrument of 
Surrender, “the Diaoyu Dao, as affiliated islands of Taiwan, should be returned, together with 
Taiwan, to China.”152 However, the Cairo Declaration, Potsdam Declaration, and Japanese 
Instrument of Surrender were all negotiated with Chiang Kai-shek’s Republic of China and not 
the People’s Republic of China, which has allowed for ambiguity regarding territorial 
sovereignty. The complexities and ramifications of the Republic of China’s KMT solely 
representing all Chinese interests in designing the Western-based post-WWII World Order are 
still felt today, and their echoes can also be heard in the South China Sea. 
 
The 2012 China Anti-Japanese Demonstrations and Weibo’s Role 
As mentioned in the previous section, the April 2012 plan announced by Tokyo governor 
Shintaro Ishihara to purchase the privately-owned Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, 
on behalf of the local Japanese government, sparked large-scale public protests across China. In 
the months following the announcement, Sino-Japanese relations were strained, and the Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested vehemently as the Japanese began to take measures to 
purchase several islands. However, on August 15, 2012, the anniversary of the announcement of 
Imperial Japan’s surrender, tensions reached a tipping point. Activists from Hong Kong sailed to 
and landed on one of the disputed islands, but were stopped and detained by Japanese 
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authorities. 153  The detained activists were deported two days later; nevertheless, the act of 
detaining the activists sparked the first wave of anti-Japanese demonstrations across China, in 
which Weibo users played a fundamental role. 
Before increased Weibo censorship, Chinese netizens used the social media platform as a 
tool to quickly mobilize anti-Japanese sentiment. Through Weibo posts, Chinese users 
successfully organized boycotts of Japanese goods and mass street demonstrations in response to 
the proposed Japanese purchase of the disputed territory. At this point, the Chinese government 
was supportive of the Weibo community which quickly condemned the Japanese government’s 
actions. The CCP leaders continued to support the social media campaigns, as it was in the 
government’s interest and functioned to release broader public tension surrounding domestic 
issues which the population had been focused on before this convenient diversion. However, 
when some of the demonstrations turned violent and/or when the protestors condemned unrelated 
policies and actions taken by the Chinese government, this caused local authorities to intervene. 
Nevertheless, protests continued sporadically for nearly a month. As the September anniversary 
of the Mukden Incident (九一八事件 Jiǔ yī bā shì biàn) approached, Weibo was used by the 
CCP to mobilize the masses in a second wave of anti-Japanese protests in many regions in the 
country. The anniversary of the Japanese staged bombing of railroad tracks near modern day 
Shenyang, which led to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, is remembered and written by its 
date “the 9/18 incident,” which reinforces the magnitude of the event and its impact on the 
nation’s consciousness. As September 18th neared, protests began to be reined in by the 
authorities in many metropolitan areas including Xi’an and Shanghai. The restrictions included 
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cracking down on the use social media to organize protests, which was already illegal, but 
quickly began being enforced after the government’s current agenda had been achieved. 
There is a growing body of literature surrounding the escalatory role of propaganda in the 
2012 China Anti-Japanese Demonstrations, but also on Chinese individuals who criticized the 
movement and served as de-escalatory and “rational” voices on Weibo. Chinese cyber 
nationalism, paired with anti-Japanese sentiment, fueled the movement, but some sources claim 
that the CCP had a more direct role rather than simply just sanctioning the protests. Richard 
McGregor noted “baroque, staged qualities” in the movement and language used during the 
protests, which he linked to the upcoming 18th National Party Congress. 154 As this important 
event was only two months away, the 2012 Anti-Japanese Demonstrations “required extra 
vigilance to ensure the demonstrations [did not] morph into anger at grievances closer to 
home.”155 In addition to Chinese government officials’ indirect and direct involvement with both 
inciting and breaking up the protests, online individuals also aided in reducing the nationalistic 
fervor by commenting on the violence exhibited by some protestors and comparing it to other 
events in Chinese history. 
Pre-recent-censorship Weibo functioned as a place where past memories and history were 
discussed, especially those of a controversial nature, and “the most frequently mentioned 
historical event [was] the Cultural Revolution,” where it was often contrasted with events 
transpiring in the present context. 156 Many Weibo users linked the “chaotic situation [of the 
2012 Anti-Japanese Demonstrations] to the Cultural Revolution,” and it was seen as particularly 
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problematic among more liberal-leaning individuals and groups. 157 As a result of this 
connection, “many of the ‘patriotic’ activities—such as smashing Japanese cars, boycotting 
Japanese goods, and even beating up Japanese citizens—were labeled ‘irrational’ on Weibo.”158 
These criticisms and historical parallels were “mostly contributed by media professionals… 
[who noted the pattern of] extremely violent and irrational forms of nationalist expression.”159 
Open public discussion and condemnations of the Cultural Revolution “is quite limited, not to 
mention activities such as public commemoration,” which further conveys the impact, and risk, 
of these reproachful and de-escalatory statements made by scholars, journalists, and 
individuals.160  
Weibo has consistently served as a mobilization tool, but before its censorship it also 
served as a tool to mitigate excess nationalistic tendencies and promoted alternative views rather 
than those sanctioned by the CCP. However, with the new censorship laws, citizen journalism 
became challenging and non-government approved narratives are much less accessible. The 
Chinese government learned that Weibo was a useful mobilization asset, but could be 
detrimental to its agenda when its users were not reined in. Consequently, it designed ways to 
utilize Weibo to its own benefit, rather than risk possible detrimental mobilization against CCP 
interests. Subsequently, within its post-censorship context, Weibo is largely no longer able to 
serve as “a warning sign to the public of the possibility of…chaos in society [as a result of 
violent forms of nationalism].”161 Under the administration of Xi Jinping, censorship has greatly 
increased since his first announcement of the “Chinese Dream” and Xi has amassed and 
                                                          
157 Ibid. Page 95. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Le Han, E. (2016). Micro-blogging memories: Weibo and collective remembering in contemporary China. 
Springer. Page 96. 
160 Ibid. Page 94. 
161 Ibid. Page 96. 
Lydia Field 75 
 
centralized power by reducing the number of his political rivals. The online echo-chamber of the 
escalation of nationalism seen on Weibo since 2017 mirrors the on the ground reality of Xi’s 
administration. Since Xi has surrounded himself with those who either agree with his 
expansionist agenda or those who are not willing to risk the consequences of disagreeing with it, 
the cycle of sustained escalation continues and is particularly visible in the South China Sea. 
 
The South China Sea within an Anti-Western Framework 
Evidence of the CCP’s process of expansionist nationalism cultivation and fostering 
public support for the PLA can be plainly observed on Weibo. Furthermore, since the CCP has 
strengthened its grip on the (legal) distribution of news on Weibo and implemented various 
regulations limiting dissent and access to alternative historic narratives, excessive Chinese 
nationalistic tendencies and militaristic calls to action cannot be mitigated by online de-
escalatory voices. The Chinese government’s problem with justifying its territorial expansion 
and militarization of the South China Sea is that UNCLOS, which the People’s Republic of 
China is a party to, regulates maritime entitlements based on geography and not on historical 
rights, sovereignty, or nationalism. After ruling in favor of The Philippines within the arbitration 
case brought before the Tribunal regarding China’s Nine-Dash Line, China rejected the ruling. 
Furthermore, Xi Jinping stated that China’s “territorial sovereignty and marine rights” would not 
be affected by the ruling.162 Even though China’s contested claims to the Paracel Islands, the 
Spratly Islands, Scarborough Shoal, the Pratas Islands, Macclesfield Bank, etc. have been refuted 
under The Hague’s international maritime law, decades of “patriotic education” have ensured 
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that a majority of the Chinese population still view Chinese territory as extending all the way 
through the southernmost reaches of the South China Sea to James Shoal, located only 52 miles 
off the Malaysian coast.163 
 The CCP government has control over educational curriculum, information distribution, 
and national maps, which promotes and reinforces their agenda and cultivates nationalism. As 
China failed to justify its South China Sea territorial claims and land reclamation process to the 
international community, it has returned its focus to its own people. Through decades of patriotic 
education, “the nine-dash line has been painted in the hearts and minds of the Chinese” and 
expansionist nationalism has surged.164 Furthermore, as China’s “national rejuvenation” has been 
linked with reclaiming Chinese territory lost to foreign powers, the CCP has begun to 
manufacture and/or recall old enemies into the present context. The Senkaku Islands provide a 
new issue in which a pre-existing anti-Japanese sentiment, anti-foreign sentiment and 
expansionist nationalism can coalesce around. However, the South China Sea and its many 
disputed islands provide many South and East Asian adversaries with fewer historical “insults” 
to China, necessitating that this territorial dispute be reframed as an anti-Western and anti-
American issue to further foster expansionist nationalism. It is in the CCP’s interest to galvanize 
public support around military expansion within the South China Sea, but that requires 
cultivating combative feelings against its neighboring nations and the West. Indonesia, Vietnam, 
and The Philippines all have had some form of modern anti-Chinese demonstrations, such as 
riots and protests. These nations have also objected to Chinese military expansion and island 
building within the South China Sea, and have been supported by the United States. However, 
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these disputed islands, reefs, and shoals largely were never taken from China, but due to Imperial 
China’s tributary state system, China claims them based on “historic rights.” The South China 
Sea territorial disputes are representative of a clash between the historic records of dynastic 
China and the legal principles imported with the Westphalian system and broader international 
(Western) rules-based order. Moreover, due to the patriotic education campaign and preexisting 
suspicions of the United States lingering from “the Century of Humiliation,” anti-American and 
anti-Western feelings have proved to be quite useful for generating the rudimentary level of 
expansionist nationalism required to implement the CCP’s grand strategy of replacing the United 
States’ leadership and dominance in the Asia-Pacific.  
 The legacy of imperialism and foreign invasions still affect Chinese thinking today, and 
the lessons China learned during the “Century of Humiliation” are currently being applied in the 
South China Sea. Over the many centuries of imperial Chinese dynastic rule, “China created 
buffers against hostile neighbors by taking territory… [but] it failed to construct southern and 
eastern maritime defenses to protest its coastline from foreign invasion by sea.”165 As a result, its 
shores were easily susceptible to incursions made by Western troops during the “Century of 
Humiliation.” By militarizing the islands in the South China Sea region, China is attempting to 
correct its historical weakness, which was exposed many times during the “Century of 
Humiliation,” and allow for the country to be able to protect itself from foreign influence and 
invasion. Furthermore, China believes that the Asia-Pacific falls under its rightful area of 
regional influence. Therefore, Chinese government leaders reacted with haste to ensure the 
longevity of China’s strategic positions within the region when the United States announced in 
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2011 that it would shift much of its military focus from the Middle East to the Pacific. This US 
policy became known as the Pivot to Asia, but “the Pivot announcement was a public relations 
disaster,” and sparked Chinese historical anxieties regarding its position as the regional 
hegemon.166 Beijing interpreted the Pivot to Asia as the US’s “aim to contain China as it once 
had the Soviet Union,”167 or at the very least, as an attempt to “stop China’s rise and 
expansion.”168 Based on China’s historical experiences in dealing with Western foreign powers, 
these fears were well founded. Consequently, “in 2012 it deployed engineers to reclaim land [in 
various island chains throughout the South China Sea] and build military bases” and China has 
done so with striking success. 169 Additionally, satellite images from 2016 showed that some of 
these Chinese military bases had “evidence of [anti-ship cruise and surface-to-air] missiles 
deployed there,” and considering the long-distance nature of these weapons, it suggests that 
China has shifted from a defensive to an aggressive posture in the South China Sea.170 
 
A Fortunate Coincidence 
The Chinese military has seen a significant funding increase since President Xi Jinping 
announced the “Chinese Dream,” particularly the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). This 
navy build up projects both power and national pride, as the “Chinese Dream” has become 
irrevocably linked to the Chinese military. Currently, China only possesses one aircraft carrier, 
the Liaoning, but is constructing more. The Liaoning functions primarily as a “training ship for 
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aircraft carrier operations,” but is still a prominent symbol of Chinese expansionist military 
power. 171 Aircraft carriers are not fundamentally necessary for defending a nation’s own shores, 
as this can be accomplished by smaller crafts, land-based planes, and missiles.172 Aircraft 
carriers create a transportable airbase, and therefore, allow the navy to be able to stage aircraft 
operations without the support of local bases. Considering China’s land reclamation and military 
construction activities in the South China Sea, an aircraft carrier supported by these strategically 
placed bases allows China to protect and further expand its expansionist aims. Aircraft carriers 
“are designed to project power far from a country’s own coasts… [and with it] China could 
dominate the South China Sea region.”173 Additionally, when at sea, “the Chinese government 
had declared a forty-five kilometer ‘safety zone’ around the Liaoning” and nothing can enter the 
area “without permission from the Liaoning’s commander.”174 Attempting to assert sovereignty 
over such a wide swath of sea is in violation “of international maritime law and the freedom of 
the seas,” and is similar to the Chinese attempt to claim a majority of the South China Sea. 175 
China is utilizing its aircraft carrier to project its military power by both using it as a domestic 
and international symbol, one of unchallengeable military authority. Consequently, the Liaoning 
has served as a tool for increasing Chinese expansionist nationalism, as the PLAN bolsters its 
military presence in the South China Sea. 
On November 25, 2012, the Chinese military announced that Shenyang J-15s had made 
five successful landings on the Liaoning’s deck using an arresting cable.176 Being able to 
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perform this maneuver successfully is a necessary precondition to being able to conduct 
maritime air operations in the South China Sea, and Chinese state media enthusiastically reported 
and disseminated the success with a video of the launchings and landings. The video had a “viral 
result” and within hours of the initial broadcast, Chinese social media users were taking and 
posting photos of themselves emulating the iconic hand gesture used by flight deck officers to 
release the J-15s.177 This Chinese staged photo fad and meme came to be known as “Aircraft 
Carrier Style” (航母-style háng mǔ-style). The meme involved extending one’s right hand while 
kneeling the left knee and bending the right leg. It emulates the Shooter’s pose, a military gesture 
used by navy personnel to signal the release of fighter jets. The name of the meme is also a 
parody of the viral song and music video “Gangnam Style” which was quite popular at the time, 
as the Chinese word for aircraft carrier “háng mǔ” sounds similar to “Gangnam.” The “Aircraft 
Carrier Style” photo postings became so prolific that Weibo made an events page solely for 
engagement with the photo fad. While Internet memes are often humorous, as they involve 
parody, it is impossible to know the intention behind each user’s participation. However, this 
example can provide broader implications about the scale of Weibo and Chinese social media 
engagement with the successes of the Liaoning, and the potential for fostering expansionist 
nationalism. 
Immediately after the successful landing missions of the Shenyang J-15s on the carrier, 
Luo Yang, the scientist who had designed the jet, suffered cardiac arrest, but his death was 
largely overshadowed by the birth of the new meme. Luo Yang spent eight days on the carrier 
and worked day and night, and it is believed that he died from overwork since he “was under 
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severe mental pressure to achieve the landing feat” and did not seek medical attention when he 
was initially feeling unwell.178 Luo Yang was posthumously honored by The Ministry of Civil 
Affairs with the title of “martyr” and memorialized. 179 "Martyr" is one of the most prestigious 
titles awarded by the Chinese government to those “who have died in protecting national 
security, fighting crime, undertaking diplomatic missions or carrying out rescue work and 
weapons and equipment tests.”180 National martyrs are usually collectively honored on Martyr’s 
Day, but Luo Yang’s case is unique, as he is memorialized annually by Chinese State sponsored 
media sources on Weibo on the anniversary of his sudden passing.   
I decided to title this subsection “The Fortunate Coincidence” for two reasons. The first 
being that a happy coincidence led me to find a bulk of my evidence for this thesis, and the 
second being that the coincidence of Luo Yang’s death and the successful J-15 launchings have 
been utilized by Chinese state sponsored media and other CCP-approved media sources to foster 
expansionist nationalist feelings in the South China Sea. Out of curiosity I happened to search 
“航母-style” on Weibo on the anniversary of the first successful launchings of the J-15s off the 
Liaoning, and stumbled upon the “还记得航母 style吗?” (“[Do you] still remember Aircraft 
Carrier Style?” Hái jì dé hang mǔ style ma?) meme tag on Weibo. I observed Chinese media 
sources utilizing the anniversary of the death of Luo Yang, now a highly symbolic national 
martyr, to garner nationalistic feelings around Chinese military and air powers in the South 
China Sea. Various media sources all utilized the same skeleton of the post, and reposted it on 
Weibo with only slight variations. State sponsored and state approved media sources co-opted a 
neutral and parodic meme, to increase social media engagement with their “martyr,” to foster 
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nationalistic feelings and galvanize public support over Chinese military endeavors in the South 
China Sea. This common theme of institutionalized anniversary creation, honoring national 
heroes and martyrs, and promoting Chinese military power in the South China Sea through 
mobilizing language can be seen from years of Weibo posts dating back to 2015. Furthermore, to 
accurately convey the expansionist nationalism cultivation effort, I traced Weibo posts from 
2015-2018 regarding Luo Yang, and discovered that with each passing year, the language and 
rhetoric used becomes increasingly more expansionist and nationalistic. 
Translation:  
First News: “(Did you forget him today? Cherish the memory of Luo Yang.) From @人民网, do you still 
remember Aircraft Carrier Style? In November of that year, J-15s successfully landed on the aircraft carrier 
platform of the Liaoning ship. On the same day, Luo Yang, the general director of development for the J-
15, fell. On November 25, 2012, China Aviation Industry Group Chairman Luo Yang, suddenly developed 
an acute myocardial infraction while on the aircraft carrier, and died after receiving emergency medical 
treatment, he was 51. Today is the #third anniversary of Luo Yang’s death#, pay tribute to the backbone of 
the nation!” 
 
Figure 4: 11/25/2015 Weibo post from First News memorializing Luo Yang 
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Translation: 
Henan Normal University Research Institute: “#Research Institute Headlines# [Do you] still remember 
Aircraft Carrier Style? Four years ago today, China’s first aircraft carrier, the “Liaoning Ship,” successfully 
launched and landed J-15 carrier-based aircrafts. Once the carrier-based aircraft took off and the image was 
broadcast, the [flight deck] commander’s handsome and powerful take-off signal subsequently became 
popular. However, on the same day, Luo Yang, the general director of development, suddenly developed an 
acute myocardial infraction and fell, and died at the age of 51. He traded his life in exchange for the perfect 
launch of the fighter! Today, relive this gesture that made the Chinese people proud and remember to 
cherish the memory of the backbone of the nation!” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: 11/25/2016 Weibo post from Henan Normal University Research Institute memorializing Luo Yang 
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Translation: 
CCTV News: “#That Year Today# ([Do you] still remember Aircraft Carrier Style? Today, pay tribute to 
Luo Yang!) Five years ago today, China’s first aircraft carrier, the “Liaoning Ship,” successfully launched 
and landed J-15 carrier-based aircrafts. Once the carrier-based aircrafts took off and the image was 
broadcasted, the [flight deck] commander’s take-off signal subsequently became popular. However, on the 
same day, Luo Yang, the general director of development, fell… In 2012, Luo Yang was selected as the 
Chinese person of the year. Today, relive this gesture that made the Chinese people proud and cherish the 
memory of the model worker and hero of aviation who dedicated himself to serving the country, Luo 
Yang!” 
 
Figure 6: 11/25/2017 Weibo post from CCTV memorializing Luo Yang 
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Translation:  
Military newspaper reporter: #This Day in Military History# ([Do you] still remember Aircraft Carrier 
Style? Today, pay tribute to Luo Yang) [Do you] still remember Aircraft Carrier Style? Today in 2012, 
when fellow compatriots witnessed the perfect launch of the J-15s through the TV, on the ship, Luo Yang 
was (also) entering the countdown of his life. When the public expressed their inner joy with “Aircraft 
Carrier Style,” the hero, who created the miracle on the aircraft carrier, suddenly passed away. This is a 
sorrowful moment that belongs to China, forward (this post), and pay tribute to the backbone of the nation! 
 
Figure 7: 11/25/2018 Weibo post from a military newspaper reporter for People’s Liberation Army Daily memorializing Luo Yang 
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The Weibo post in Figure 4 uses some nationalistic mobilizing language in calling for 
Chinese citizens to “pay tribute” to Luo Yang, but the post presents factual information 
surrounding Luo Yang’s death and does not attempt to mislead the reader or distort the facts. 
This 2015 post more closely resembles that of a social media platform news bulletin when 
compared to later versions of this post. The Weibo post in Figure 5 uses the same nationalistic 
mobilizing language as the previous version of the post in calling for Chinese citizens to “pay 
tribute” to Luo Yang, but also incorporates more nationalistic rhetoric surrounding Luo Yang’s 
actions by claiming that “he traded his life in exchange for the perfect launch of the fighter.” 
This Weibo post also characterizes PLAN personnel as “handsome and powerful” and promotes 
public support of military actions by connecting the Chinese military with national pride. This 
2016 post still presents the factual information surrounding Luo Yang’s death and does not 
attempt to distort the fact that he died of a heart attack. Ultimately, this post resembles that of a 
social media platform news bulletin with added propaganda.  
By classifying him as a “model worker and hero of aviation who dedicated himself to 
serving the country,” the Weibo post in Figure 6 uses more overt nationalistic mobilizing 
language than the previous version in calling for Chinese citizens to “relive the gesture” and 
“cherish the memory” of Luo Yang. This Weibo post promotes public support of military actions 
by associating the PLAN with fostering and securing Chinese national pride. Additionally, this 
2017 post attempts to mislead to reader by removing the circumstances surrounding Luo Yang’s 
death, as it is reported that he simply “fell.” This post resembles that of propaganda with added 
historical information. Furthermore, by posting this message on the verified CCTV Weibo 
account, this greatly increased the viewership of and engagement with this particular post. The 
Weibo post in Figure 7 was written by a military newspaper reporter for the People’s Liberation 
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Army Daily: the Chinese military’s newspaper. It uses less overt nationalistic mobilizing 
language than the previous versions of this post, and the nationalistic phrases are well woven into 
the structure of the post. In calling for Chinese citizens to “pay tribute” to Luo Yang, the author 
also added that other users should forward the post, which would ultimately increase viewership. 
This 2018 Weibo post promotes public support of PLAN actions by linking the “Aircraft Carrier 
Style” meme to an expression of Chinese national pride in the aviation accomplishments of the 
military. Additionally, this post slightly distorts the circumstances surrounding Luo Yang’s 
death, as it is reported that he was “entering the countdown of his life” and “suddenly passed 
away,” failing to mention his heart attack. This post is a well-crafted propaganda story, as Luo 
Yang is called a “hero” and it is suggested that his death is a sadness which needs to be 
acknowledged by all of China. Despite their differences in rhetoric, each of these posts 
incorporates the use of the phrase “Aircraft Carrier Style” to reach a broader online audience 
when promoting Chinese PLAN triumphs in the South China Sea, with the ultimate goal of 
increasing Chinese expansionist nationalism. 
 
Summary 
 Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream” seeks to mobilize the Chinese people in support of PLAN 
activities in the South China Sea and normalize its expansionist activities. Under the guidance of 
Xi Jinping’s administration, the preexisting foundation of Chinese nationalism, cultivated through 
decades of “patriotic education,” has been reinforced through new coordinated expansionist 
nationalism campaigns. The addition of new nationalistic holidays, the ever increasing number of 
“national heroes,” as seen in the case of Luo Yang’s martyrdom, and the decreasing legal paths of 
dissent and de-escalation, Chinese external-oriented nationalism is actively being shifted into an 
expansionist form to achieve the CCP’s goal of indisputable dominance over the South China Sea.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The “Chinese Dream” is the vision of a powerful military, one which under the 
leadership of the CCP, can rejuvenate the Chinese nation by reclaiming territory lost to foreign 
powers during “the Century of Humiliation” and by the collapse of China’s imperial tributary 
state system. More specifically, the “Chinese Dream” seeks to mobilize the Chinese people in 
support of the PLAN’s actions in the South China Sea and normalize its expansionist activities as 
being within China’s indisputable sovereign territorial rights. Under the guidance of Xi Jinping’s 
administration, the preexisting foundation of external-oriented Chinese nationalism, cultivated 
through decades of “patriotic education,” has been reinforced through coordinated nationalism 
campaigns and shifted into its expansionist form. Since Xi Jinping assumed power, China’s 
legislature has approved the addition of nationalistic anniversaries and holidays, increased the 
numbers of “national heroes” and “martyrs,” and limited the legal paths of dissent and de-
escalation. The new holidays serve to institutionalize anti-Japanese and anti-Western sentiments, 
promote Chinese nationalism, and ensure loyalty to the Party by celebrating the CCP’s role in 
halting any future national “humiliations” and defeating Imperial Japan. These national 
observances are designed to encourage nationalistic feelings and celebrate all those who died 
resisting foreign invaders during the “Century of Humiliation,” and rebrands modern Chinese 
nationalism as one linked to resistance rather than expansion.  
Xi’s government has passed numerous regulations that bolsters China’s existing legal 
censorship framework to include online challenges made to the Party’s distorted narrative of 
history. This has allowed the government to take steps to secure Weibo as a beneficial escalatory 
mobilization tool to broadcast and promote the Party’s expansionist agenda. Moreover, as the 
CCP is able to control the degree in which the Chinese public is able to access information and 
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alternative news sources, its narrative of indisputable sovereignty of the South China Sea 
remains resolute. Xi could easily use the CCP’s narrative of history and Chinese collective 
memory issues surrounding the “Century of Humiliation” as tools of mobilization, and the CCP’s 
ever growing control over Weibo could force the social media platform to assume this escalatory 
mobilization role. Furthermore, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands protests could serve as a possible 
model for the future online mobilization of anti-American and anti-Western sentiments. The 
“patriotic education” campaign has taught generations of the Chinese populace that the South 
China Sea falls under Chinese sovereignty, and as a result of surging expansionist nationalism, 
the Chinese people are more willing to defend this claim, even by force. 
The most extreme expansionist voices continuously force the CCP to take ever more 
strong and confrontational positions to not appear “weak” against perceived foreign incursion to 
its territory in the South China Sea. Furthermore, as China has already successfully constructed 
several artificial island military bases in the South China Sea, the CCP would greatly “lose face” 
if it suddenly abandoned them and seemingly accepted the unfavorable UNCLOS arbitration 
tribunal ruling. China’s broader political environment of surging anti-foreign sentiments and 
public support for expansionism is not compatible for seeking any concessions, and therefore, 
China is largely entrenched in both its strategic and political positions. I encourage the United 
States to continue its freedom of navigation operations, especially with the backing of a broader 
European and Southeast Asian nation coalition. I would also suggest that these operations’ stated 
objectives be reoriented from solely claiming to protect the maritime flow of trade to also 
serving as a demonstrated commitment to and support for our security partners and allies within 
the region. However, as the overall objective is regional stability and peace, I would warn against 
engaging in naval or aerial brinkmanship. As any collisions, or near-collisions, as seen with the 
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USS Decatur, will likely result in Chinese claims of Western provocation and could even provide 
a pretext for justifying combative actions taken against foreign ships in the name of defense. 
 
Translation: “Released a headline article: ‘The South China Sea may become a hot spot in Sino-
American Relations,’ the US guided missile destroyer “(USS Decatur)” cruised through the South 
China Sea one day before the 69th National Day of China.” 
 
Figure 8:10/1/2018 Weibo post with an article link about the incident with the USS Decatur 
Returning to the September 30, 2018 incident between the USS Decatur and the Lanzhou, 
many American media sources referenced the ongoing US-China trade war as an explanation for 
the Chinese destroyer’s aggressive maneuvering. While Western sources explained the incident 
through the broader context of the trade war, Chinese Weibo sources cited the proximity to 
National Day. Western sources neglected to mention that the incident occurred the day before 
Chinese National Day, and therefore was likely a result of both the trade war tensions and 
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Chinese nationalism. Moreover, by referencing the short temporal distance between the day of 
the incident and National Day, this likely implies that the Chinese populous views the timing as 
intentional, and therefore, an extreme act of provocation. Signifying that Chinese media sources, 
and citizens alike, on Weibo have begun perceiving the very intentions behind Sino-American 
interactions within a schema of nationalist outrage. 
The most extreme nationalistic voices have pushed the CCP to adopt increasingly more 
aggressive and assertive postures in responding to international incidences. I worry that when the 
next major international crisis erupts, the Chinese de-escalatory voices may be drowned out, 
censored, or will simply not be present on Weibo to defuse and combat the online calls for war.  
My greatest fear is that the CCP will continuously be pushed and pulled by the most extreme 
expansionist voices of its populous, and may stumble into or be pressured into a “hot” war in the 
South China Sea by the very expansionist nationalism it created. 
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